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Notes
The Minnesota Supreme Court: 1979
This Note reviews decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1979
that had a significant impact on Minnesota law. Traditiona broad
categories of substantive law, such as Criminal Law and Procedure
and Torts, are included, as well as more narrowly defined categories,
such as Marriage Dissolution and Public Employees. Because of the
wide range of topics covered, however, certain traditional categories,
such as constitutional law and evidence, are treated throughout the
Note rather than in a single section. The decisions have been evaluated
by considering both the issues settled and the new questions raised. The
commentaries contained in this Note are necessarily concise and con-
sider only one or two issues. Of course, many undoubtedly important
developments have been omitted, but those omissions have permitted
greater critical analysis of the decisions reviewed.
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I. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. ANTINEPOTISM RULES
In Kraft, Inc. v. Statej the Kraft corporation denied full-
time employment to several of its part-time employees because
they were married to persons already employed by the firm.2
Kraft's antinepotism rule permitted only one member of an im-
mediate family3 to be employed full-time at a Kraft facility.
The part-time employees charged that to the extent this rule
implicated the husband-wife relationship, it discriminated on
the basis of "marital status" in violation of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (MHRA).4 The issue for the court was
whether the MHRA's marital status provision refers simply to
one's personal status or whether it encompasses both personal
status and the identity of one's spouse. The Minnesota
Supreme Court adopted the latter definition, holding that an-
tinepotism rules, insofar as they apply to the spousal relation-
ship, constitute marital status discrimination and are
impermissible except when demonstrably based on a "compel-
ling and overriding bona fide occupational qualification."5
1. 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979).
2. For a discussion of other civil rights cases decided in 1979, see note 20
infra.
3. The rule defined immediate family as father, mother, husband, wife,
son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, and in-laws. 284 N.W.2d at
387.
4. MIN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.14 (1978 & Supp. 1979). Section 363.03(1) of the
Minnesota Statutes provides in part- "Except when based on a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, it is an unfair employment practice: . . . (2) For an em-
ployer, because of ... marital status..., (c) to discriminate against a person
with respect to his hire, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, fa-
cilities, or privileges of employment." Mum. STAT. § 363.03(1) (1978).
5. 284 N.W.2d at 387. The court suggested that the result it reached was
intended by the legislature. It also expressed the fear that antinepotism rules
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The court's broad interpretation of the MHRA's marital sta-
tus provision appears unwarranted. Although the part-time
employees in this case could have obtained full-time jobs from
Kraft if they had not been married to full-time employees who
worked in the same facility, it was not the status of the part-
time employees as married persons that caused the problem.
Rather, the problem was attributable to the occupational status
of the part-time employees' spouses.
Antinepotism rules are generally based on the sound expe-
rience of employers, not on employers' unfair stereotypes that
are the proper object of antidiscrimination law. 6 Moreover, an-
tinepotism rules focus on the type of employee relationships-
brother-sister, parent-child, or husband-wife-that can conflict
with legitimate company interests.7 It therefore seems unlikely
that the legislature intended the MHRA's marital status provi-
sion to undermine the application of antinepotism rules that
discriminate on the basis of the occupational status of spouses.
Because a common business concern underlies the proscrip-
tion of all forms of nepotism in employment relationships, if
the legislature had intended to totally eliminate no-spouse
rules, such intent would have more logically been manifested
in a complete ban on antinepotism rules, rather than in an im-
plicit ban on such rules only as they apply to spouses.
Even though some no-spouse rules might be without ra-
barring the employment of spouses would create economic pressures leading
couples "to forsake the marital union and live together in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.34 [thereby undermining] the preferred status enjoyed by the insti-
tution of marriage." 284 N.W.2d at 388. It is curious that the court would proffer
an argument based on the "preferred status" of the marital union when the
statute at issue expressly prohibits such a preference. Moreover, the logical so-
lution to such economic pressures is not a broad proscription of all spousal an-
tinepotism rules, but the enactment of specially designed administrative
regulations applicable to "one-company" towns in which such pressures are
most likely to occur.
6. In Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), the de-
fendant's no-spouse rule was found presumptively invalid as sex discrimination
because plaintiffs showed that the rule disproportionately affected women. The
court held the presumption rebutted, however, because the defendants showed
that it was supported by sound business reasons.
7. This reasoning has led at least one court to hold that antinepotism
rules are outside the ban on marital status discrimination. See Thomson v.
Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977). See also Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human
Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1978) (upholding adminis-
trative regulation that prohibits blanket no-spouse rules as marital status dis-
crimination but that approves no-spouse rules that are necessary to "avoid
business-related conflicts of interest") (quoting Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150
(1975)).
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tional basis,8 the test adopted in Kraft for evaluating these
rules is far too stringent since it sanctions only those spousal
antinepotism rules that are supported by "compelling and over-
riding" business necessities.9 Although some rules can survive
this level of scrutiny, the problem is that the test prohibits an-
tinepotism rules that are based on sound, but not necessarily
compelling, business considerations. 0 A better test would per-
mit any antinepotism rule-regardless of the type of family re-
lationship implicated-unless it was not reasonably related to
sound business considerations." If the court does not modify
the test announced in Kraft, the Department of Human Rights
should promulgate regulations prohibiting antinepotism rules
based only on the spousal relationship, but allowing less nar-
rowly focused antinepotism rules so long as they are reason-
ably related to legitimate business considerations.
B. AFFECTIONAL PREFERENCE
In Big Brothers, Inc. v. Minneapolis Commission on Civil
Rights,'2 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the rights
of homosexuals who apply to serve as volunteer "big broth-
ers."1 3 The plaintiff alleged that certain practices followed by
the Big Brothers organization violated a Minneapolis ordinance
banning discrimination based on "affectional preference.' 4
The practices that were challenged included Big Brothers' pol-
8. One example might be a rule barring spouses from working for a large
company even though their job-settings and career paths are wholly unrelated.
9. 284 N.W.2d at 388.
10. The court stated that "[mreere business convenience is insufficient" to
support antinepotism rules. Id. Yet such convenience could be a sound busi-
ness consideration in some settings. For example, many small partnerships-
including law fi-ms-adopt antinepotism hiring rules to avoid disharmony and
the appearance of favoritism since subjective criteria are essential elements of
the hiring decision. Antinepotism rules preclude these issues from arising.
Since many firms do not adopt such rules, however, it is doubtful that this pur-
pose can be characterized as "compelling and overriding."
11. The amended rule at Kraft, for example, allows current full-time em-
ployees to marry but prohibits spouses from supervising each other and from
working on the same shift or in the same department or elsewhere when there
is a conflict between the spouses' interest and that of the company. The court
noted this new rule without comment. Id. at 387 n.l.
12. 284 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1979).
13. The Big Brothers organization matches fatherless young boys with
adult male volunteers who act as surrogate fathers.
14. The ordinance on which the plaintiff based his claim was section
945.030(A) (5) of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances. See 284 N.W.2d at 825
n.1. Both the current version of the ordinance, Mn-NEAPOms CODE OF ORDi-
NANCES § 139.40(h) (1978), and the version on which the plaintiff based his
claim are reprinted in Big Brothers. See 284 N.W.2d at 826 n.6.
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icy of inquiring into the sexual preference of applicants and of
informing mothers of the result of the inquiry only if the appli-
cant expressed a homosexual preference. The court held that
both the inquiry and the selective communication of responses
are permissible under the ordinance. The court upheld the in-
quiry because it was related to matters of legitimate interest to
mothers and was not expressly prohibited by the ordinance.
The court reasoned that the practice of calling a mother's atten-
tion only to those applicants who reveal a homosexual prefer-
ence was not "actual discrimination" because Big Brothers also
alerted mothers to applicants having other atypical traits. 5
The court's resolution of the discrimination issue not only
is ill-considered,16 but appears to conflict with the definition of
discrimination provided in the ordinance. Under the ordinance,
"unequal treatment" of a protected class constitutes discrimi-
nation.17 In the Big Brothers organization, homosexuals and
heterosexuals are clearly accorded unequal treatment: only ho-
mosexual applicants have their sexual preference disclosed to
mothers. Moreover, the sole basis for this unequal treatment is
the homosexual status of the applicants-a protected status
under the ordinance.18 Thus, Big Brothers' policy of selectively
disclosing affectional preferences is plainly discriminatory
within the meaning of the Minneapolis ordinance.
The hearing examiner had concluded that for the inquiry
into affectional preference to be proper, Big Brothers must in-
form mothers of the responses of all applicants. This solution
meets the informational needs of mothers without discriminat-
ing among applicants. Alternatively, the court could have ac-
knowledged that the selective communication policy was
discriminatory but could have approved it based on the special
facts of the case. This outcome was possible because all parties
conceded that the mother was ultimately free to discriminate
among applicants on any basis. Thus, the court could have
characterized Big Brothers' selective communication policy as
15. The court noted that Big Brothers calls special attention to applicants
having criminal records. 284 N.W.2d at 827.
16. In essence, the court has deemed the unequal treatment of homosexu-
als to be nondiscriminatory because Big Brothers also treats other "atypical"
groups--such as convicts-unequally. This suggests that the unequal treat-
ment of blacks would be nondiscriminatory so long as other atypical groups-
such as chicanos-were subject to the same unequal treatment.
17. "'[D]iscrimination' includes any... policy or practice, which results
in the unequal treatment, separation or segregation of ... a class protected by
this title." MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 139.20(g) (1976).
18. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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simply facilitating the mother's right to discriminate. When
"unequal treatment" merely facilitates permissible discrimina-
tion, the "facilitation" itself is not illegal.19
The court in Big Brothers was probably influenced by the
fact that society has not yet afforded homosexuals the same
support against discrimination that it has afforded racial minor-
ities and other protected classes. Yet it is precisely for this rea-
son that it would have been better for the court to acknowledge
the discrimination and either eliminate it-as the hearing ex-
aminer recommended-or approve it based on a rationale, such
as facilitation, that helps delineate the boundaries of impermis-
sible discrimination. 20
II. CONFLICTS OF LAW
An activity giving rise to litigation must have more than a
"slight" relationship to the forum state if the forum is to apply
its own law.1 In Hague v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2 the Minne-
19. This notion of "facilitative discrimination" is implicit in much of the an-
tidiscrimination law. In the employment setting, for example, inquiry into a
protected area, such as marital status, is generally banned unless related to a
bona fide occupational qualification. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam). Although such an inquiry is harmless on
its face, it is restricted because it can only facilitate subsequent, impermissible
discrimination. To approve the Big Brothers' selective communication policy
based on this "mere facilitation" rationale, a court would have to read this con-
cept into the discrimination ordinance. The alternative taken by the court in
Big Brothers, on the other hand, was to "read out" of the ordinance an impor-
tant definition of discrimination. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
20. Two other significant civil rights cases were decided in 1979. In Kaster
v. Independent School Dist. No. 625, 284 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1979), the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the repeated failure of a school district to promote a
highly qualified Jewish teacher to an administrative position was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This ruling is significant because
applicants for administrative positions are usually evaluated on the basis of
subjective criteria under which employers can camouflage discriminatory prac-
tices.
In Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 282 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. 1979), an applicant who
had been denied full-time employment because he had experienced asthma as
a child charged the defendant with employment discrimination based on physi-
cal disability. Although the complaint was brought under the St. Paul Human
Rights Ordinance, Ford asserted a defense under section 363.02(5) of the Min-
nesota Statutes, which allows a company to refuse employment when an appli-
cant's disability would pose a "serious threat" to his own health or safety.
MmN. STAT. § 363.02(5) (1978). The court held that Ford could assert the statu-
tory defense, but remanded the case for further fact-finding on the nature of
the disability. The court's ruling appears to require employers to show that
there is a current risk to the applicant's health in order to successfully invoke
the defense.
1. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143, 150 (1934). See also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930).
2. 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (1980).
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sota Supreme Court applied Minnesota law, which allows
"stacking"3 of insurance claims, to a suit arising out of a fatal
highway accident that occurred in Wisconsin. Wisconsin law
does not permit stacking.4 All persons involved in the accident,
as well as the plaintiff, who was not involved, were Wisconsin
residents. Moreover, all three of the decedent's insurance poli-
cies were written in Wisconsin. Minnesota's "contact" with the
controversy was created when, after the accident, the plaintiff
moved to Minnesota.5
To resolve choice of law questions, Minnesota courts em-
ploy a test that requires them to consider five factors: (1) pre-
dictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and
international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4)
advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) ap-
plication of the better rule of law.6 In Hague, the court found
the first three factors of this test inapplicable. But since stack-
ing would result in the plaintiff receiving a greater award, the
court found that the application of Minnesota law would serve
the forum's governmental interests by "keeping [the plaintiff]
off welfare rolls and enabling [her] to meet financial obliga-
tions."'7 The most important factor in the court's decision to ap-
ply Minnesota law, however, was its belief that Minnesota's
stacking rule was simply a better rule of law than Wisconsin's
no-stacking rule.
3. In Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d
348 (1973), the court held that an insured who had paid premiums on more than
one policy could "stack" the benefits of those policies, multiplying his award.
In Hague, the plaintiff's decedent was killed while riding on an uninsured mo-
torcycle. The decedent owned three automobiles, each carrying uninsured mo-
torist coverage of $15,000. By "stacking" these claims, the plaintiff could receive
up to $45,000.
4. 289 N.W.2d at 48 n.8. See Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d
558, 569, 217 N.W.2d 670, 675 (1974).
5. The court also cited certain less compelling contacts: (1) the decedent
had been employed in Minnesota for 15 years; and (2) the defendant conducted
business in Minnesota. 289 N.W.2d at 46-47. These types of "contacts," how-
ever, normally bear on the jurisdictional rather than the choice of law issue.
The court also noted that Minnesota had a number of "interests" in the contro-
versy: (1) the state's policy of compensating injured plaintiffs to the maximum
extent of their injuries; and (2) the state's interest in the administration of es-
tates. Id. at 47. But these interests are not the types of contacts that help de-
termine the constitutional choice of law issue; rather, they simply guide the
court in its use of discretion once the constitutional issue has been resolved.
See notes 12-14 infra and accompanying text.
6. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 161, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1973).
This test was taken from a proposal made in Leflar, Choice-Influencing Consid-
erations in Conflict Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 282 (1966).
7. 289 N.W.2d at 49.
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It was reasonable for the court to assess Minnesota's com-
pensatory interest in the controversy at the time of the litiga-
tion rather than at the time of the accident, because Minnesota
was the plaintif's current domicile and would have to support
her if she was unable to collect adequate compensation. The
problem with this approach, however, is that if courts attach
too much significance to events unrelated to the controversy,
such as a subsequent change in domicile, they will encourage
forum-shopping.8 Thus, in auto-accident cases most courts con-
sider post-accident events, if at all,9 only to the extent that the
events occur in a forum state that already has significant con-
tacts with the controversy.' 0 Similarly, the "better rule of law"
rationale employed by the court in Hague is usually applied
only in cases in which the activities leading to the controversy
are in themselves sufficient to establish minimum contacts with
the forum state." The Hague court's liberal application of Min-
nesota's choice of law test was possible only because the court
broke from precedent requiring the existence of some specific
contact other than an after-the-fact change of domicile.
Choice of law cases actually raise two issues. One is con-
stitutional: does the forum state have sufficient contacts with
the activities leading to the controversy to justify the applica-
tion of its own law?12 The second issue is discretionary: as-
suming that minimum contacts do exist, should the forum state
8. There is also a danger that courts might use such trivial contacts to jus-
tify resorting to "forum preference among substantive rules." Leflar, supra
note 6, at 287. Professor Leflar points out that although rules preference is gen-
erally within constitutional bounds, it may indicate the forum state's lack of re-
spect for the laws of the nonforum state. Such disrespect raises issues of
federalism and comity. See id.
9. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 555-56, 432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal. Rptr.
31, 34 (1967). Compare Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 3-5, 241 A.2d 372, 374-75
(1968) with Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 33, 216 A.2d 781, 783 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 237 N.E.2d 877, 882, 290
N.Y.S.2d 734, 741-42 (1968). See generally Note, Post Transaction or Occurrence
Events in Conflict of Laws, 69 COLUm. L REV. 843 (1969).
11. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973) (forum
state situs of accident and plaintiff's subsequent hospitalization); Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1967) (plaintiff and defendant both residing in
forum at time of accident). Another important factor in these cases is that the
application of nonforum law would have totally denied compensation to the
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 ILL 322, 252
A.2d 176 (1969) (charitable organization immunity); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis.
2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967) (guest/host statute).
12. See cases cited in note 1 supra. This inquiry is similar to that engaged
in by courts when deciding personal jurisdiction questions. See cases cited in
note 17 infra. Of course, one distinguishing factor is that domicile in the forum
state at the time of suit is normally conclusive of the jurisdictional question but
not of the choice of law question.
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apply its own law? The factors relied on in Hague-Minne-
sota's interest in victim compensation and its "better" rule of
law-apply only to the second issue.13 They are reasons for ap-
plying Minnesota law, assuming that minimum contacts exist,
but they are not in themselves contacts that link state law to
the controversy.14 For the Hague court, the contact giving Min-
nesota the opportunity to apply its own law was that the plain-
tiff moved to Minnesota before bringing suit.'5 In a similar fact
situation, however, the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that such a contact is "without significance" on the constitu-
tional level.16 Recently, the minimum contacts concept has
been developed more fully in personal jurisdiction cases.17 In
these cases, the Court has emphasized that fairness to the par-
ties is a crucial factor and has used the minimum contacts doc-
trine to ensure that "states through their courts do not reach
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-
equal sovereigns in a federal system."' 8
In choice of law cases, these constitutional considerations
mean that courts should, as a matter of due process, provide
some minimum protection for the defendant's reasonable ex-
pectation that a controversy will be tried according to the law
of a state having some nontrivial contact with the activities un-
derlying the controversy.19 Such contacts should include some-
thing more than a unilateral act of the plaintiff that is virtually
13. The choice of state law test used in Hague was meant to apply only if
constitutional or federal law did not preclude its use. See Leflar, supra note 6,
at 270-71 & n.20.
14. Nevertheless, the court in Hague seemed to believe that the factors in
the choice of law test actually constitute "contacts" for the purpose of due proc-
ess analysis. See 287 N.W.2d at 49 (discussion of factors four and five).
15. But see note 5 supra.
16. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930).
17. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), the Court emphasized the exist-
ence of identifiable contacts between the controversy and the forum quite apart
from the theoretical interests the state may have in the outcome of the case.
See id. at 565-66.
18. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980).
19. The court in Hague stated that since automobiles travel from state to
state, insurers accept the risk that they might be held liable under a stacking
law, regardless of where the policy was written. 289 N.W.2d at 50 (on rehear-
ing). This oversimplifies the issue; insurance companies accept the risk that
they may be liable under stacking statutes when there are sufficient contacts
between the stacking forum and the accident giving rise to the claim. As an ac-
tuarial matter, however, insurance companies are entitled to expect that some
accidents will evince no contacts with a stacking forum and that liability will be
less for these accidents. See generally Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 33, 216
A.2d 781, 783 (1966).
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unrelated to the underlying activities.2 0 Moreover, it is unfair
for a state to apply its own law to a controversy with which it
has almost no significant contacts, because doing so may un-
dermine the law of another state by subtly encouraging forum-
shopping. In the extreme case, this unfairness reaches consti-
tutional dimensions. The activities underlying the controversy
in Hague bear such a trifling relation to Minnesota that the ap-
plication of Minnesota law offends due process: it is unfair to
the defendant2l and unnecessarily derogates the law of Wiscon-
sin. Since the threshold constitutional test has not been met, it
is immaterial that Minnesota has some governmental interest
in the outcome or that the Minnesota rule is a "better" rule.
I. CRTMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. FouRTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. Automobile Searches
Under the automobile exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement, a police officer has sufficient probable
cause to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if he
has a reasonable belief that the vehicle contains articles that he
is entitled to seize.] In State v. Gallagher,2 the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of an automobile
that had been stopped for speeding, applying the "totality of
the circumstances" test for probable cause.3 According to the
20. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567
(1980).
21. See note 19 supra.
1. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); State v. Harris, 265
Minn. 260, 265, 121 N.W.2d 327, 331-32, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 867 (1963). Cf. State
v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 437, 190 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1971) (examples of what may
constitute probable cause to search a person stopped for a traffic violation).
The mobility of the vehicle creates an exigency that justifies search and seizure
without a warrant. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221
(1968); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
2. 275 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1979).
3. Id. at 804. After the defendant and his passenger had gotten out of the
car, the officer asked the defendant for permission to inspect a brown paper
bag lying on the front seat of the car. The defendant refused and the officer
then "informed defendant that he was under arrest and that [the officer] could
search the vehicle." Id. at 805. An officer has no authority to search an automo-
bile simply because he has arrested one of its occupants. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1969). Nevertheless, the defendant's passenger handed the
bag over to the officer. Only after observing that the bag cohtained marijuana
did the officer inform the defendant and his passenger of their Miranda rights.
The defendant subsequently was convicted of possession of a controlled sub-
stance and sentenced to a term of not more than three years. 275 N.W.2d at 805.
1980] 1191
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court, the driver's immediate exit from the car,4 the awkward
attempts of his passenger to conceal a brown paper bag, and
the "glassy stares" of both occupants of the car 5 combined to
establish sufficient probable cause for the search.6
It is questionable whether there was probable cause in Gal-
lagher since probable cause cannot be established by furtive
gestures alone.7 Although other minor factors may have been
present in Gallagher, these factors were probably insufficient
to create a reasonable belief that the automobile contained arti-
cles the officer was entitled to seize. If the totality of circum-
stances test is to deter abusive or discriminatory police
conduct,8 it must be applied more rigorously. For example, in
State v. Charley,9 the court appropriately found probable cause
to search the defendant's automobile after it had been stopped
for a traffic violation, because the defendant's furtive gestures
were coupled with other incriminating circumstances. In Char-
ley, the police had observed the defendant and a teenager mak-
ing an exchange in a parking lot known for drug transactions.
The officer followed the defendant's car, noticing that it was
"weaving erratically." After being stopped by the officer, the
defendant, while getting out of his car, made a "furtive move-
ment" as if placing something under the car seat. The officer
4. The court recognized that the defendant's immediate exit might have
been purely innocent and conceded that, standing alone, such conduct could
not justify a thorough search. The court, however, would permit an officer to
take a cursory look into a vehicle under such circumstances. 275 N.W.2d at 807.
But see People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 827-28, 478 P.2d 449, 462-63, 91
Cal. Rptr. 729, 742-43 (1970).
5. The arresting officer testified that he observed "wide" stares. From this
testimony the trial court concluded that both the defendant and his passenger
exhibited "glassy stares." 275 N.W.2d at 808.
6. Id. The trial court had based its finding of probable cause not only on
these three factors but also on the passenger's inability to state her destination.
Id. at 806.
7. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925); People v. Supe-
rior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 478 P.2d 449, 455, 91 CaL Rptr. 729, 735 (1970); Com-
ment, Criminal Law: Furtive Movement and Vehicle Searches-People v.
Superior Court, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 449, 459 (1971). See generally Annot., 45
A.L.R.3d 581 (1972).
8. See Project, Marijuana Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and
Administration in Los Angeles County, 15 U.C.L.A. L REV. 1499 (1968). "A
large percentage of the arrests for marijuana possession results from the stop-
ping of automobiles for minor traffic violations." Id. at 1533. Suggesting that
probable cause may be "written in" as an afterthought, the authors add, 'The
suspicion that this does occur is heightened by the almost total uniformity of
the arrest reports. The traffic officer appears to be aware that if he tailors his
report to a certain style with certain facts, he will almost certainly have it ac-
cepted by the court." Id. at 1534 n.95, quoted in People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
3d 807, 827 n.13, 478 P.2d 449, 463 n.13, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 742 n.13 (1970).
9. 278 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1979).
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then observed that the defendant had trouble walking and that
his speech was slurred.1O The officer in Charley had specific
knowledge linking the defendant to evidence of a possible
crime, but the officer in Gallagher "had no more than a suspi-
cion that the bag [in the defendant's car] contained contra-
band."" If courts were to require prosecutors to establish
probable cause by showing both deliberate furtive actions by
the defendant and specific knowledge on the part of the officer
linking the defendant to evidence of a crime,' 2 they would re-
move the incentive for officers to use "furtive movements" as a
subterfuge for conducting searches based on nothing more
than a hunch. The test for probable cause must be this de-
manding if it is to effectuate the fourth amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.13
2. The Exclusionary Rule
Two 1979 decisions, State v. Hodgesl4 and State v. Olsen,15
considered the admissibility of evidence tainted by an illegal
search. In both cases the court, by admitting evidence obtained
in warrantless searches, reduced the effectiveness of the exclu-
sionary rule as a deterrent of police misconduct.
In Hodges, the sublessor entered the defendant sublessee's
warehouse to discuss some financial matters with him.16 Be-
cause he did not find the defendant there, the sublessor re-
corded the license plate number of one of the many dismantled
trucks in the warehouse and went to the police, hoping that
they would run a license check to help locate the defendant.
Upon hearing a description of the dismantled trucks, two police
10. Id. at 518-19.
11. State v. Gallagher, 275 N.W.2d at 809 (Wahli, J., dissenting).
12. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968).
13. In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a number of warrantless
vehicle searches when illegal objects were in plain view of the police. See
State v. Tungland, 281 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1979); State v. Yaeger, 277 N.W.2d 405
(Minn. 1979); State v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1979). The court also up-
held a warrantless search when the police discovered that the defendant, who
had been involved in an accident and had asked them to tow his car, had been
identified by a victim as her assailant. See State v. Waters, 276 N.W.2d 34
(Minn. 1979).
14. 287 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1979).
15. 282 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1979).
16. 287 N.W.2d at 415. The check that the defendant had given the subles-
sor for the first month's rent was not honored by the bank. The sublessor
went to the warehouse to inform the defendant of the bad "check and to collect
the next month's rent. The sublessor had a key to the defendant's warehouse
and had reserved the right to enter the premises at any reasonable time. Id. at
414.
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detectives accompanied the sublessor to the warehouse, re-
corded license plate and serial numbers from the vehicles in-
side, and confirmed that several were stolen. A short time
later, the defendant arrived at the warehouse and the police ar-
rested him. A search warrant was obtained after the defend-
ant's arrest.'
7
In Olsen, police went to the scene of a fire after fire fighters
had reported seeing marijuana seeds and ether on the prem-
ises. Before obtaining a search warrant, one of the police of-
ficers searched the defendant's garage and examined the items
that had attracted the fire fighters' attention. More than four
hours later, the officer returned with a warrant and seized "con-
trolled substances, weapons, devices for measuring and packag-
ing controlled substances, laboratory equipment, and
chemicals."' 8
In both Hodges and Olsen, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found the warrantless searches illegal, since neither search was
justified by exigent circumstances.19 The court refused, how-
ever, to suppress the evidence obtained2o because in each case
warrants could have been issued based upon information avail-
able prior to the illegal search.2 1 Although the court was under-
standably reluctant to exclude reliable physical evidence, 22
these decisions implicitly sanction warrantless searches in situ-
ations in which there is sufficient information and time to ob-
tain a warrant before the search. In this respect, the decisions
are at odds with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary
rule.23 In cases such as Hodges and Olsen, police do not signifi-
17. Id. at 415.
18. 282 N.W.2d at 530.
19. 287 N.W.2d at 415; 282 N.W.2d at 532.
20. 287 N.W.2d at 415-16; 282 N.W.2d at 532.
21. 287 N.W.2d at 415-16; 282 N.W.2d at 532. In Olsen, the court character-
ized the information illegally obtained by the officers as cumulative to that ob-
tained by the fire fighters and fire investigators who were legally on the
premises. 282 N.W.2d at 532 (citing State v. Sorenson, 270 Minn. 186, 200-01, 134
N.W.2d 115, 125 (1965)). The Sorenson case relied on in Olsen, however, is ar-
guably inapplicable since it dealt with the quantum of evidence necessary to
support a conviction, not the quantum necessary to establish cumulative infor-
mation for probable cause.
22. In both Hodges and Olsen, the illegally obtained evidence was "pri-
mary" evidence of the crime, and its exclusion would probably have resulted in
the reversal of the defendants' convictions. Compare Clough v. State, 92 Nev.
603, 555 P.2d 840 (1976) (court applied exception to exclusionary rule to save
primary evidence) with State v. Crossen, 21 Or. App. 835, 536 P.2d 1263 (1975)
(court refused to apply exception to exclusionary rule to save primary evi-
dence).
23. See, e.g., Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional
Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 88, 99 (1974); Comment, Fruit of the Poi-
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cantly "benefit" from their illegal conduct since they would
have had little trouble obtaining search warrants legitimizing
their actions. By removing the certainty that illegally obtained
evidence will be inadmissible, courts encourage police to pro-
ceed without a warrant whenever it is inconvenient to obtain
one. Such unjustified invasions of privacy could be prevented
if courts would apply the exclusionary rule more strictly, at
least until an alternative is found.
3. Searches of Attorneys' Offices
In O'Connor v. Johnson,24 the Minnesota Supreme Court
examined the validity of a warrant authorizing the search of an
attorney's office for documents belonging to one of the attor-
ney's clients. As part of a liquor license investigation, the po-
lice had obtained a search warrant to seize certain business
records of the attorney's client. The attorney challenged the
warrant but the trial court ordered him to produce all of the
records listed in the warrant except those that constituted his
work-product. In granting the attorney's petition for a writ of
prohibition to quash the search warrant, the Minnesota
Supreme Court distinguished several recent United States
Supreme Court decisions 25 and held that under the Minnesota
Constitution26 a warrant is "unreasonable and, therefore, inva-
lid when the attorney is not suspected of criminal wrongdoing
and there is no threat that the documents sought will be de-
sonous Tree: Recent Developments As Viewed Through its Exceptions, 31 U.
MLzn L. REV. 615, 627-28 (1977).
24. 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979).
25. The court noted that in this case there was no claim of wrongdoing by
the attorney, as in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), and that the per-
son under investigation was not urging a fifth amendment claim against a third-
party summons directing his attorney to produce documents for the LR.S., as in
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973). See 287 N.W.2d at 402. The court also distinguished Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court up-
held a warrant authorizing the search of a newspaper office because the
newspaper had announced its policy of destroying documents that might aid in
the prosecution of protesters. See 287 N.W.2d at 405. There is no evidence that
the attorney in O'Connor had any intention of destroying the documents in
question; he would have been subject to professional discipline if he had de-
stroyed them. See id. at 405. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILrrY DR 7-102(A) (3) (1978).
26. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. Although article I, section 10 is identical to the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, the court relied on the
state constitution, presumably to insulate its decision from the United States
Supreme Court's tendency to condone searches of innocent third parties. See
note 25 supra.
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stroyed."27
This result is commendable, since the alternative proce-
dure-obtaining a subpoena duces tecum28-is more appropri-
ate when attorney-client relationships are implicated. Even the
most particularly drawn warrant threatens the confidentiality
of client files29 as well as the attorney-client privilege,3 0 the
work product immunity,31 and the right of criminal defendants
to counsel.32 Because attorneys have a special obligation to the
legal system,3 3 they have a strong incentive to honor the order
as completely as possible. Although the subpoena procedure
may slightly delay prosecutors, the inconvenience it creates is
outweighed by the societal interests it protects.3 4
27. 287 N.W.2d at 405.
28. In a criminal proceeding, a subpoena may be issued to require produc-
tion of documents before a grand jury or before a court. See MImN. R. CRIM P.
22.01-.02. A subpoena carries much less potential for invasion of protected pri-
vacy rights than a warrant because the enforcement of a subpoena can be chal-
lenged in an adversary proceeding. In addition, a subpoena allows the person
in possession to produce the requested documents without having to endure an
unnecessary, intrusive search of a specified area. See Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560-63 (1978); Falk, Are Law Offices Safe?, 6 BARRISTER 17,
17-18 (1979).
29. If the attorney in O'Connor had not been present to guide the police,
the police would have had to "rifle through" the attorney's files to satisfy the
warrant. 287 N.W.2d at 404.
30. See McCoRMcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 87-97 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(2) (1978)
(without consent of client, attorney cannot be examined regarding communica-
tions made to him by the client or advice he has given to client). See also ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBnxry EC 4-1, DR 4-101 (1978).
31. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Under MINN. R. C=IM. P.
9.02(3), an attorney's work-product is immune from discovery in criminal ac-
tions. See also McCoRMICK, supra note 30, § 97. In civil actions, it is discover-
able "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable with-
out undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
some other means." MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3). See also McCoRMICK, supra,
§ 96.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 611.07 (1978) (providing criminal defendants charged
with felony or gross misdemeanor with right to assistance of counsel). Com-
pare Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in misde-
meanor prosecutions punishable by imprisonment) and Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony prosecutions) with Scott v. Illi-
nois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (right to counsel limited to cases resulting in actual im-
prisonment). See also MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
33. See 287 N.W.2d at 405 ("Attorneys are required by statute, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the oath of admission to the bar to preserve
and protect the judicial process.").
34. But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560-63 (1978) (in certain
cases, subpoena procedure too time-consuming to be practical alternative). See
generally Bissinger, Law offices providing records sanctuary, St. Paul Pioneer
Press, Feb. 3, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (reactions of judges and attorneys to court's
ruling in O'Connor).
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B. FIT AMENDMENT-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
1. Non-Compliance with Subpoena Duces Tecum
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
prohibits the state from compelling a person to testify against
himself or to produce incriminating evidence in a testimonial
manner.3 5 In State v. Alexander,36 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a municipal court order, which directed the de-
fendants to retain "intact and in its entirety" an allegedly ob-
scene film and to produce the film at a probable cause
hearing,37 violated the fifth amendment. By obeying the order,
the court reasoned, the defendants would admit that the film
was in their possession or control and that it was in fact the
film described in the court's order.38 The court dismissed the
argument that the state would not rely on the act of production
to prove possession or control, noting that if such were the case
the state "should have been willing to give defendants immu-
nity from use of any evidence obtained by producing the film,
except that pertaining to the question of obscenity."39
Alexander is consistent with the fifth amendment premise
that the state bears the burden of proving its case against a
criminal defendant.40 No United States Supreme Court opinion
has considered the precise issue raised in Alexander, but the
Court has recognized that "[t]he act of producing evidence in
response to a subpoena ... has communicative aspects of its
own," and may be both "testimonial" and "incriminating."4 1 Al-
though, in Alexander, police officers had already viewed the
film at the defendant's theater, the court was correct in charac-
terizing compelled production of the film at a probable cause
35. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966).
36. 281 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1979).
37. Id. at 350. In Minnesota, an allegedly obscene film cannot be seized un-
less there has been a prior adversary hearing at which it is established that the
state has probable cause to believe the film is obscene. City of Duluth v.
Wendling, 306 Minn. 384, 390, 237 N.W.2d 79, 83 (1975). To find probable cause,
however, the magistrate need not view the film. Id. at 389, 237 N.W.2d at 83.
38. By complying with the subpoena, the defendants might, for evidentiary
purposes, authenticate the film as the one described in the subpoena. See
United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1976).
39. 281 N.W.2d at 352.
40. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940). When obscene films are involved, not all courts
strictly adhere to this premise. See, e.g., Houston v. Manerbino, 185 Colo. 1, 521
P.2d 166 (1974); People v. Modern Amusement Co., 72 Misc. 2d 950, 340 N.Y.S.2d
748 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Taylor v. State, 529 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. 1975).
41. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
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hearing as testimonial. 42 And, because exhibiting obscene films
is illegal,43 this "testimony" would clearly be incriminating. By
affirming only that portion of the trial court's order that re-
quired the defendants to retain the film intact for trial,44 the
court struck a fair balance between the state's interest in pros-
ecuting obscenity and the respect the state "must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens."45
2. Voluntary Confession
The fifth amendment prohibits the use of a defendant's
confession 46 as evidence against him if the confession was
given involuntarily.47 In State v. Orscanin,48 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that an eighteen-year-old defendant had
given his confession voluntarily, even though he had been con-
fined for six days in close quarters49 before making the confes-
sion. The majority found that the situation was not coercive
enough to render the defendant's statements involuntary as a
matter of law.5 0
The court's analysis in Orscanin is unpersuasive. Although
the defendant was legally detained,51 the environment was cer-
tainly coercive. 52 During his six-day confinement, he was al-
42. "Compliance with the subpoena [duces tecum] tacitly concedes the
existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control." Id. A mu-
nicipal ordinance, applicable in Alexander, makes it illegal to exhibit, sell, or
distribute obscene "motion picture film." MImAPOLIS, MnN., CODE OF ORDI-
NANCES § 385.130 (1976). See generally MINN. STAT. § 617.241 (1978); Note, Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination Does Not Bar Seizure of Personal Papers, 28
MERCER L. REV. 581 (1977).
43. See MmNEAPoLs, MNN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.130 (1976).
44. 281 N.W.2d at 353.
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
46. In two recent cases related to this topic, the court held: (1) that once a
defendant asserts his right to counsel, any further interrogation by the police
must cease until the defendant's attorney is present, see State v. Crisler, 285
N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 1979); and (2) that no comment on the defendant's exer-
cise of his right to remain silent may be made at trial even in response to a
question by the defense counsel, see State v. Underwood, 281 N.W.2d 337, 342
(Minn. 1979).
47. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); State v. Biron, 266
Minn. 272, 282, 123 N.W.2d 392, 399 (1963); Note, The Minnesota Supreme Cour;
1962-1963, 48 MINN. L. REV. 119, 160-65 (1963).
48. 283 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1979).
49. The defendant was detained in a six- by ten-foot room containing only
a bed. He was allowed out only to shower and to use the toilet. Id. at 899.
50. The court noted that the defendant did not claim that he was promised
less austere conditions of confinement in exchange for his confession. Id. at
900.
51. He was confined for violating his parole agreement. Id. at 899.
52. Cf. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MIN. L. REV. 893 (1980) (dis-
cussing the moral and constitutional aspects of the state's use of coercion in
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lowed to see no one except his parole officer and was given the
impression, in his single conversation with the officer, that he
would be treated as a juvenile if he cooperated with the po-
lice.5 3 In addition, the defendant was taken out of isolation
soon after he confessed.5 4 This evidence suggests that the de-
fendant's confession was not voluntary, but rather the result of
his coercive confinement, a misunderstanding about his status
as an adult,5 5 and his lack of contact with an attorney, family,
or friends. To protect against self-incrimination, a court must
be satisfied that a defendant's confession was voluntarily
given.56 In view of the evidence presented, the court's conclu-
sion that Orscanin's confession was voluntary is suspect.57 It is
irrelevant here that the truth-seeking aspect of criminal prose-
cution sometimes outweighs the necessity for suppressing con-
fessions when only a technical violation of the fifth amendment
has occurred 5 8-psychological coercion, such as that in Or-
scanin, is more than a technical violation.
the plea bargaining process). The court in Orscanin distinguished State v.
Weekes, 312 Minn. 1, 250 N.W.2d 590 (1977) (confession obtained after defend-
ant had been confined for 34 hours was involuntary because defendant was not
arrested and was interrogated repeatedly during his confinement). See 283
N.W.2d at 901. See also MIN. R. CanM. P. 4.02(5) (1).
53. 283 N.W.2d at 899-900. The parole officer, who had spoken with the po-
lice before speaking to the defendant, urged the defendant to be honest with
the court and discussed the possibility of placing the defendant in a half-way
house. The defendant testified that from his conversation with the parole of-
ficer he inferred that his case would be processed through the juvenile system.
54. Id. at 900.
55. Cf. State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272, 282, 123 N.W.2d 392, 399 (1963) (confes-
sion of 18-year-old, on parole at the time of his arrest, held involuntary because
police statements "could only have had the effect of implanting in the defend-
ant's mind the hope that he would be treated as a juvenile offender or that in
any event the charge against him might ultimately be disposed of on the basis
of a lesser charge").
56. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); State v. Wadja, 296 Minn. 29,
206 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
57. See generally Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some
Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963). Under the "police methods" test, which does not
go to the inherent believability of a confession, the United States Supreme
Court has reversed convictions when the evidence included a confession ob-
tained after extended detention and unrelenting interrogation. See Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1976). Although
unrelenting interrogation was not a factor in Orscanin, the defendant's near-ju-
venile status and the extended solitary confinement undoubtedly combined to
exert similar psychological pressures on him.
58. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-25 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting) (discussing social disutility of automatic suppression of confessions
obtained in violation of Miranda principles).
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C. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CRIMES
1. Impeachment
Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a "veracity-
related" crime, whether a felony or a misdemeanor, can be in-
troduced to impeach the credibility of the witness.5 9 Evidence
that the witness has been convicted of any other type of felony
may be introduced only if the trial judge finds that the proba-
tive value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.60 In
State v. Brouillette,61 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a
lower court ruling that if the defendant, who was accused of
fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, took the stand on his
own behalf, the prosecution could impeach his testimony with
evidence of the defendant's previous conviction for third-de-
gree criminal sexual conduct.62 The defendant never took the
stand. The court assumed that had the defendant taken the
stand, a cautionary instruction to the jury that it consider the
prior conviction only insofar as it relates to the defendant's ve-
racity could have protected the defendant from prejudice.
In Minnesota, prosecutors once had absolute discretion to
introduce evidence of prior convictions to impeach defendants
who had taken the stand'on their own behalf.63 This rule often
severely prejudiced defendants in the presentation of their
cases, 64 even though trial courts were obliged to instruct jurors
that prior convictions could be considered only insofar as they
59. AmN. R. Evm. 609(a) (2). Veracity-related crimes are those such as
fraud that involve "dishonesty or false statement." See McCoRmcic, supra
note 30, § 43, at 89-90. See also F.R. EviD. 609, Conference Report.
60. MmN. R. Evin. 609(a)(1).
61. 286 N.W.2d 702 (Minn. 1979).
62. The incident giving rise to the prosecution in Brouillette occurred eight
days after the defendant was released from a county jail where he had been
serving time for the earlier sexual offense. Id. at 705 n.4.
63. See City of St. Paul v. DiBucci, 304 Minn. 97, 99-100, 229 N.W.2d 507, 508
(1975). The rule was intended to aid the jury in seeing "the whole person." Id.
at 100, 229 N.W.2d at 508. However, for cases holding that the introduction of
evidence of past conviction is prejudicial even when its introduction is permit-
ted by statute, see State v. Stewart, 297 Minn. 57, 209 N.W.2d 913 (1973); State v.
West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1969).
64. The fear of opening his past record might deter a defendant from even
taking the stand. In this situation, not only is the defendant prejudiced by the
adverse inference drawn by the trier of fact who must speculate as to why the
defendant did not take the stand, but the jury is deprived of testimony that it
should hear if it is to find the truth. See United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 785
(2d Cir.) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897 (1977); State v.
Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979). On the issue of prejudice, see
State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1969); FED. R. Evm. 609, Report of
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary; McCoRMIcK, supra note 30, § 43, at 89-90; id. at
11 (Supp. 1978).
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related to the witness' credibility.65 Thus, when Minnesota
adopted new rules of evidence in 1977, it placed an additional
obligation on trial courts-the obligation to determine whether
admitting evidence of a prior conviction for a crime only indi-
rectly related to veracity would produce results that are more
probative than prejudicial.
In most cases, this test should be easy to apply. An excep-
tion is the Brouillette-type case, in which the prior crime is of
recent vintage and of strikingly similar nature to the crime
before the court. It is here that evidence of the prior crime is
both highly probative66 and highly prejudicial.67 In such close
cases, when the balance clearly favors neither probative value
nor prejudicial effect, the reviewing court should not circum-
vent the difficult weighing task by falling back on the hollow
cautionary instruction rationale. This only encourages lower
courts to do the same when faced with difficult evidentiary
problems. The Minnesota Supreme Court has already deline-
ated the factors that courts must use when weighing probative
value against prejudicial effect.68 The court should have ap-
plied only these factors to the evidence at issue in Brouillette
and ignored whatever speculative salutory effect a cautionary
instruction might have.
2. Crimes for Which the Defendant Has Been Acquitted
In State v. Wakefield,69 a case involving rape, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision to admit
evidence that the defendant had once before been charged with
65. City of St. Paul v. DiBucci, 304 Minn. 97, 100, 229 N.W.2d 507, 508 (1975).
66. Brouillette had been out of jail for only eight days when the sexual
misconduct in question occurred. The more recent a prior conviction, the less
likely the offender is to have been rehabilitated. See generally MCCoRMICK,
supra note 30, § 43, at 11 n.60.3 (Supp. 1978). Also, in Brouillette, it was basi-
cally the word of the accuser against that of the accused. When the accused's
credibility is the central issue in a case, evidence that he has been recently
convicted of a similar crime undercuts his credibility insofar as he is denying
culpability for the crime before the trier of fact. See United States v. Ortiz, 553
F.2d 782, 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897 (1977).
67. If the prior conviction was for a crime of a nature similar to the one
before the court, its introduction may invite the jury to infer the defendant's
guilt rather than to simply call into question his veracity as a witness. See
United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867
(1977).
68. See State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978). The factors are:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior conviction; (2) the date of conviction
and the defendant's subsequent history; (3) the similarity of the past crime to
the charged crime; (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5) the
centrality of the credibility issue. Id.
69. 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979).
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and acquitted of rape. Overruling State v. Lucken,70 the court
reasoned that it would be "fundamentally unfair" to force the
defendant repeatedly to contest the previous charge.71
Although the rule adopted in Wakefield is not yet followed
by a majority of jurisdictions,72 it clearly represents the more
reasoned approach 3 because it respects the basic tenet of our
judicial system that upon acquittal the matter of a criminal
charge is closed.7 4 The prejudicial effect of introducing evi-
dence that the defendant has in the past been charged with a
similar offense is great, while the probative value of such evi-
dence is slight because there is no way of discovering why the
jury acquitted him of the charge.
D. SHACKLING DEFENDANTS
In State v. Stewart,7 5 the defendant appealed from a con-
viction for first-degree murder, alleging that he was denied a
fair trial because the trial judge ordered that the defendant be
shackled to his chair during voir dire and trial. Basing its deci-
sion on a psychiatric report76 which had indicated that the de-
fendant might "become vocal or get out of order in court,"77 a
threatening letter that the defendant had sent to the prosecu-
70. 129 Minn. 402, 152 N.W. 769 (1915). In Lucken, evidence of prior crimi-
nal charges was admitted at the defendant's trial because the law did not re-
quire its exclusion and because it was unclear whether the defendant had been
acquitted.
71. 278 N.W.2d at 309. The court emphasized that "[i]n the eyes of the law
the acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent and in the interests of fair-
ness and finality made no more to answer for his alleged crime." Id. at 308. See
Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1972).
72. See Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 1132, 1135-36, 1146-47 (1962) (majority has
adopted rule that defendant's acquittal of another offense does not render evi-
dence of that offense inadmissible).
73. See, e.g., Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1972); State
v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 304-07, 350 P.2d 756, 761-64 (1960).
74. See State v. Burton, 281 N.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Minn. 1979) (reversible er-
ror for court to admit evidence of prior robbery charge of which defendant had
been acquitted). But see State v. Matteson, 287 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn. 1979)
(court admitted evidence of prior sexual conduct of defendant and victim in
trial on charges of third-degree sexual assault).
75. 276 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1979).
76. Id. at 55-56. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that
any time the court determines that there is reason to doubt the defendant's
competency, a psychiatrist or psychologist must be appointed "to examine the
defendant and to report to the court on his mental condition." MIN. R. CnMe.
P. 20.01(2) (3). The defendant had requested such a report. 276 N.W.2d at 55.
77. 276 N.W.2d at 56-57. The report also indicated that the defendant may
have been suicidal, but that he was not mentally ill. Id.
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tor,7 8 and the seriousness of the offense,7 9 the Supreme Court
upheld the trial judge's actions.
Although a trial judge is given discretion to decide when
physical restraint of a defendant is necessary, shackling should
be used rarely because the specter of a defendant in shackles
will seriously prejudice him in the eyes of the jury.8 0 Shackling
has been criticized even if imposed after a defendant has dis-
rupted court proceedings,8 1 and it is "virtually unheard of when
the defendant has committed no overt disruptive act in open
court."82 In Stewart, the defendant not only had informed the
court that he wished to cooperate, but also had cooperated
when taken to the doctor without restraint several days before
trial. On these facts, it seems unfairly prejudicial to shackle
the defendant when there was only the possibility of hostility
and disruption. The court should have reversed and remanded
for a new trial.83
E. JUVENmES
1. Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses at a Dispositional
Hearing
The procedural protections accorded juveniles at the dispo-
sitional stage of juvenile proceedings were examined in In re
G.S.J.'s Welfare.84 Counsel for the juvenile had sought to
cross-examine the youth's probation officer, but the referee re-
fused to swear the officer as a witness. The referee did, how-
ever, allow counsel to submit cross-examination questions to
the court. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that section
260.155(6) of the Minnesota Statutes8 5 grants juveniles the right
78. See id. at 56, 59. The defendant later wrote a letter of apology to the
prosecutor, and personally apologized to him in court. Id.
79. Id. at 62 (first-degree murder).
80. See note 81 infra.
81. See Note, Guidelines for Controlling the Disruptive Defendant, 56 MmiN.
L. REV. 699, 710-14 (1972); Note, Illinois v. Allen: The Unruly Defendant's Right
to a Fair Trial, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 141-42 (1971). See also The Supreme
Court; 1969 Term, 84 Hnv. I- REv. 1, 90, 94-99 (1970).
82. 276 N.W.2d at 63 (Otis, J., dissenting).
83. See generally Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970); State v. Jones,
311 Minn. 176, 182, 247 N.W.2d 427, 431 (1976); State v. Klinkert, 271 Mlinn. 548,
549, 136 N.W.2d 399, 400 (1965).
84. 281 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1979).
85. This statute, which governs hearings under the Juvenile Court Act,
provides: "The minor and his parent, guardian, or custodian are entitled to be
heard, to present evidence material to the case, and to cross-examine witnesses
appearing at the hearing." MIN'. STAT. § 260.155(6) (1978). See also MINN. Juv.
CT. R. 6-4 (1980).
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to cross-examine witnesses, but concluded that because of the
informal nature of juvenile proceedings,8 6 the procedure
adopted by the referee in G.S.J was sufficient.87
Although the concurring justices argued that no statutory
right to cross-examine exists, the majority's statutory analysis
is more persuasive.88 Moreover, the right to cross-examine
should be available to juveniles as a general policy matter be-
cause of the similarities between juvenile court dispositions
and criminal court adjudications.8 9 Nonetheless, because the
informal nature of juvenile court proceedings puts emphasis on
determining what action would best serve the interests of the
child, the court in G.S.J. correctly held that a juvenile's right to
cross-examine need not be coextensive with those granted in
criminal trials.90
86. See MINN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (1978); HENNEPIN COUNTY Juv. CT. R. 5.23,
JuVENiLE COURT, HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA, BENCH BOOK 52(4th ed. 1977).
87. 281 N.W.2d at 514. The court affirmed the juvenile's transfer to Red
Wing Training School, reasoning that "[c]ounsel for the juvenile having de-
clined to exercise the right [to cross-examination] granted by the referee can-
not now assert that the juvenile was denied his statutory right of informal
cross-examination." Id.
88. Since section 260.181(2) of the Minnesota Statutes, which deals ex-
pressly with dispositional hearings, accords the juvenile no right to cross-ex-
amine, MINN. STAT. § 260.181(2) (1978), the justices found that no statutory right
existed. Section 260.155, however, applies to juvenile hearings in general, ex-
cept where specifically limited. See MmN. STAT. § 260.155 (1978). Nothing in
subdivision 6 indicates that dispositional hearings are excluded from the sec-
tion's coverage. Moreover, rule 6-3 of the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules spe-
cifically provides that "fa]ll dispositional hearings before the juvenile court
shall be conducted in accordance with [MINN. STAT.] § 260.155." MINN. Juv. CT.
R. 6-3 (1980). Although the state juvenile court rules do not apply in Hennepin
County, where this case arose, they do indicate the intended scope of section
260.155.
89. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967). See also Note, Minnesota Juvenile
Court Rules: Brightening One World for Juveniles, 54 MINN. L. REV. 303, 347
(1969).
90. The court noted in dicta that, although it did not have to consider
whether a constitutional right to cross-examination existed, the method pro-
posed by the referee would comport with any such right that did exist. 281
N.W.2d at 514. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that juveniles have
the right to cross-examine at the adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings, see
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1967), but has explictly declined to decide the
question for dispositional hearings. Id. at 27. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
359, 366 (1970). The Court's reluctance to resolve this issue reflects its aware-
ness of the impracticality of having witnesses testify to the type of information
contained in a probation report in open court subject to cross-examination. See
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949). Lower courts have thus found
no due process violation when cross-examination has been denied. See, e.g., In
re Meek, 236 N.W.2d 284, 289-90 (Iowa 1975); In re Josephine M., 384 N.Y.S.2d
794, 53 A.D.2d 540 (1976). But see In re Milton P., 358 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79, 45 A.D.2d
1010, 1011 (1974) (court erred in overruling demand for right to cross-examine
the psychologist who testified at juvenile's dispositional hearing). See also In-
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2. Juvenile Standard of Care
In In Re S.W.T.,91 the Supreme Court refused to employ an
adult standard of care for determining whether two twelve-
year-old boys, who had killed a man by carelessly firing a rifle,
were guilty of criminally negligent manslaughter. The juvenile
court applied an adult standard and found the boys delin-
quent.92 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the boys
should have been held only to a standard of "conduct and ap-
preciation of risk reasonably to be expected from an ordinary
and reasonably prudent juvenile of a similar age."93
In a 1961 case in which civil negligence was charged, Dellwo
v. Pearson,94 the Supreme Court found that a juvenile who
caused injury with a "dangerous instrumentality" should be
held to an adult standard of care.95 The court in S.W.T. refused
to apply the Dellwo standard in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings because of the different policies that underlie adjudica-
tions of civil and criminal culpability. In finding civil liability in
Dellwo, the court had been primarily concerned with the equi-
ties of the blameless victim: its goal was to facilitate recovery.
The juvenile justice system, however, is not designed to ensure
victim compensation. Rather, it seeks only to identify-for
assistance or punishment9 6-those juveniles who have deviated
terim Commission Comment, 17 MmN. STAT. ANN. 600 (1971) (section 260.155(6)
"intended to outline the basic rights of the individuals involved in the hearing
without codifying the rules of evidence, many of which are inappropriate to the
setting and unnecessary in a case tried before a judge rather than a jury").
91. 277 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1979).
92. The juvenile court stated: "While children are normally held to a dif-
ferent standard of care than adults by reason of their infantile status, neverthe-
less in dealing with matters of extreme danger to the general public such as
guns, children are held to the adult standard of care as a measure of protection
for other persons." 277 N.W.2d at 513-14.
93. Id. at 514. The court said consideration should also be given to "factors
such as mental retardation, emotional disturbances, etc., which would reduce
the juvenile's mental or emotional age below his chronological age." Id. at 514
n.5.
94. 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).
95. See id. at 458-59, 107 N.W.2d at 863; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 283A, Comment c at 16 (1965) (adult standard of care applies where child en-
gages in activity normally undertaken only by adults and requiring adult quali-
fications).
96. Traditionally, the juvenile justice system has attempted to enhance the
welfare of offenders through rehabilitation and treatment. See Mnrrr. STAT.
§ 260.011(2) (1978); Note, Basic Rights for Juveniles in Juvenile Proceedings
Under the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules: A Response to Gault, 54 MIN. L
REV. 335, 335 n.3 (1969). In recent years, however, the lack of success in this
respect has led to a greater emphasis on "retribution, condemnation, deter-
rence, [and] incapacitation ... in the disposition of juvenile offenders." The
Supreme Court of California, 1968-1969, 58 CALrF. L. REV. 80, 249 (1970) (quoting
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from the norms set by society for children of their age. Only a
standard of care based upon age can accomplish this purpose;
otherwise, significant punishments might be imposed on chil-
dren who have done nothing more than act their age.
In addition to the policy distinction, the statutory mens
rea9 7 requirement for criminally negligent manslaughter-that
the actor "consciously takes chances of causing death or great
bodily harm to another"98-seems to require that the standard
of care used be based upon the child's age.99 Because of the
difficulty of ascertaining actual state of mind, to determine
whether a child was conscious of the potential for harm he cre-
ated, his conduct must be measured against that of a model ac-
tor. The model actor must be as similar to the child as possible
for the comparison to have any meaning.100
F. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
1. Unconscious Driver's Implied Consent to Chemical Testing
To facilitate evidence-gathering in Driving While Intoxi-
cated (DWI) cases, the legislature enacted an implied consent
statute' 0 ' under which a driver is deemed to consent to blood
testing unless he expressly refuses the test (in which case his
license is revoked for six months).102 When police request a
PRESIDENT'S CoMnI'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80 (1967); see Feld, Reference of
Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking
Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 586 (1978). Both the rehabilita-
tive and punishment modes base their determinations of culpability on the ju-
venile's circumstances.
97. The presence of mens rea is proven by showing that the actor's con-
duct was voluntary and that he must have foreseen, to an extent varying ac-
cording to the specific crime and fixed by law, "that certain consequences were
likely to follow his acts or omissions." Westbrook, MENS REA In The Juvenile
Court, 5 J. FAM. L. 121, 127 (1965).
98. MIN. STAT. § 609.205(1) (1978) (emphasis added). Violation of this
statute is a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015
(5) (a) (1978); note 99 infra.
99. The Supreme Court of California, in In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 864-
65, 464 P.2d 127, 133-34, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677-78 (1970), applied the mens rea re-
quirement to juvenile delinquency adjudications because juvenile court juris-
diction depended on violation of a law defining a crime. See also Comment,
Capacity of Minors to be Chargeable with Negligence And Their Standard of
Care, 57 NEB. L. REV. 763, 766 (1978).
100. See generally Note, A Proposal for a Modified Standard of Care for the
Infant Engaged in an Adult Activity, 42 IND. IUJ. 405, 406 (1967).
101. Act of Apr. 20, 1961, ch. 454, §§ 1-8, 1961 Minn. Laws 713 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1978)).
102. The statute is intended "to give the driver an incentive to take the
test." Anderson, Some Thoughts on Recent DWI Developments in Minnesota, 45
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test specimen and the driver does not consent to give one vol-
untarily, 03 the police must advise the driver of his rights under
the statute before his implied consent becomes operative. 0 4 In
State v. Wiehle,O5 the defendant was arrested on suspicion of
DWI and the arresting officers informed him that he would be
taken to the police station for chemical testing. Wiehle, the de-
fendant, neither objected nor consented. The officers, however,
never gave Wiehle the "implied consent advisory" required by
the statute. 06 While on the way to the police station, Wiehle
lost consciousness and was instead taken to a hospital where,
at the direction of the arresting officers, a blood sample was
drawn from him. The supreme court decided that the results of
the blood sample could be used against Wiehle in a license rev-
ocation proceeding even though the blood was taken from him
while he was unconscious. 1 0 7 The court reasoned that "[s]ince
Wiehle's physical condition precluded him from refusing the
test,... his [implied] consent remained continuous."08
The holding in Wiehle-that one who has impliedly con-
sented to chemical testing continues to consent after becoming
unconscious-is sensible, but it begs the question whether
prior to Wiehle's becoming unconscious the conduct of the ar-
resting officers had vitiated his implied consent. The court
avoided this problem by framing the issue as "whether the test
results of a blood sample taken from an unconscious person
may be used in a license revocation proceeding even though
HEmEPN LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 12. See generally Lerblance, Implied Consent
to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST. Join's L REv. 39 (1978).
103. If the driver consents to the test, the voluntary consent standard con-
trots, see MN. STAT. § 169.121 (1978), rather than the implied consent standard,
see MliNN. STAT. § 169.123 (1978), and there is no need to give the implied con-
sent advisory. State v. Rossow, 310 Minn. 399, 401-02, 247 N.W.2d 398, 400 (1976).
104. State v. LaTondress, 310 Minn. 403, 404, 247 N.W.2d 401, 401 (1976) (by
implication).
105. 287 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1979).
106. The implied consent advisory in effect when Wiehle was arrested pro-
vided that-
At the time the peace officer requests such chemical test specimen, he
shall inform the arrested person that his right to drive may be revoked
or denied if he refuses to permit the test and that he has the right to
have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing.
MumN. STAT. § 169.123(2) (1976) (amended 1978) (emphasis added). The
amended version of the advisory appears in note 114 infra.
107. 287 N.W.2d at 419. See also State v. Hart, 289 N.W.2d 478, 478 (Minn.
1979); State v. Hauge, Finance & Com., Nov. 30, 1979, at 7, coL 2 (Minn. Nov. 30,
1979).
108. 287 N.W.2d at 419. The court also found that the "unobtrusive nature of
the search, the existence of probable cause, and the need to preserve evidence
justified the manner in which the blood sample was taken. Id. at 418. See also
State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 72-74 (Minn. 1978).
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the advisory information contained in the implied consent law
was not given to the unconscious person."0 9 A driver consents
implicitly to blood testing if he is unconscious continuously
from the moment of his arrest to the time that blood must be
extracted if it is to retain evidentiary value.110 Wiehle is distin-
guishable, however, since the driver was conscious when he
was arrested and told that testing would be done, and he re-
mained conscious for some time thereafter.
A better rule would require that for implied consent to re-
main operative, an arrested driver who is informed that testing
will be done must contemporaneously be given his advisory."'
Under this standard, Wiehle's implied consent to testing would
109. 287 N.W.2d at 417 (emphasis added).
110. See State v. Hart, 289 N.W.2d 478, 478 (Minn. 1979) (driver lost control
of motorcycle and was rendered unconscious during police chase); State v.
Smith, No. 3000725 (Hennepin County Ct. Dec. 15, 1977) (memorandum) (driver
unconscious when police arrived at scene of accident), reprinted in Brief for
Respondent at RA-6, State v. Wiehle, 287 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1979); accord, Peo-
ple v. McGroder, 81 Misc. 2d 1081, 367 N.Y.S.2d 714 (Webster Town Ct., Monroe
County 1975); Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974).
111. The statute requires that the implied consent advisory must be given
"[a]t the time a chemical test specimen is requested." MIN. STAT.
§ 169.123(2) (b) (1978). Although this will often be the time immediately pre-
ceding extraction, see, e.g., State v. Hauge, Finance & Corn., Nov. 30, 1979, at 7,
col. 2 (Minn. Nov. 30, 1979) (extraction occurred once police officer reached
emergency room of hospital and read implied consent advisory to defendant), it
might also refer to the time when an arresting officer first seeks a driver's con-
sent to chemical testing. See, e.g., Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 406-07, 247
N.W.2d 385, 387 (1976) (implied consent advisory read to driver immediately
upon arrest even though he was to be brought to hospital for testing).
Prideaux held that "any person who is required to decide whether he will
submit to a chemical test... shall have the right to consult with a lawyer of
his own choosing before making that decision, provided that such a consulta-
tion does not unreasonably delay the administration of the test." Id. at 421, 247
N.W.2d at 394. The holding of Prideaux has been incorporated into the implied
consent advisory now in effect. See MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (2) (b) (3) (1978). The
court in Prideaux also noted that the 'public policy behind.. . provisions for
counsel [is] to secure for the person in custody an immediate right to commu-
nicate with counsel concerning the impending proceedings against him." 310
Minn. at 419, 247 N.W.2d at 393 (emphasis added). Since the chemical testing
process is a 'proceeding," see id., the "immediate" right to counsel should ma-
ture as soon as the driver becomes aware that such a proceeding is "impend-
ing"-that is, when he is first informed that chemical testing will be done.
Of course, both Prideaux and section 169.123 of the Minnesota Statutes im-
ply another strong reason for courts, to require that the advisory be given at
the same time as the intent to test is revealed. The mandated right to consult
counsel is limited; it does not exist if its exercise would unreasonably delay ad-
ministration of the test. Thus, by delaying the advisory, an officer may effec-
tively vitiate the driver's right to consult counsel since the later a driver learns
of this right, the more likely it is that by exercising it he will unreasonably de-
lay administration of the test.
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have been extinguished and obviously could not have contin-
ued after he became unconscious.
The court's decision to analyze the advisory information is-
sue as of the time that blood was extracted rather than at the
time Wiehle was informed that he would be tested can be ex-
plained by two factors: (1) the record did not disclose how
much time elapsed between Wiehle's arrest and the point at
which he lost consciousness; 1 1 2 and (2) Wiehle did not claim
that his advisory rights had to be delivered at the time he was
informed that chemical testing would be done." 3 Wiehle
should be confined to its facts. If a driver is conscious when ar-
rested and informed that testing is to be carried out, his im-
plied consent should be deemed extinguished until the
arresting officers give the driver his advisory, even if the driver
later loses consciousness. This rule is especially important
now that the legislature has amended the implied consent stat-
ute to include a far more comprehensive advisory than that in
effect at the time of Wiehle's arrest.114
2. Trial Court Stays of License Revocations
Minnesota law requires that a person's driver's license be
revoked upon his conviction for DWI.n5 The law also allows
112. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Brief for Respondent at 2, State v. Wiehle,
287 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1979).
113. Apparently conceding that the police did not have to read the advisory
at the time they announced their intent to test, the appellant argued that al-
though blood could be extracted from an unconscious person, it need not be
tested until the person regains consciousness and is given the advisory. In fact,
Wiehle's blood sample was frozen for two days before being tested. See Brief
for Appellant at 7-9, State v. Wiehle, 287 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1979).
114. The current version of the statute provides that a suspected inebriate
must be advised.
(1) that if testing is refused, the person's right to drive will be revoked
for a period of six months; and
(2) that if a test is taken and the results indicate that the person is
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, the person
.vill be subject to criminal penalties and the person's right to drive may
be revoked for a period of 90 days; and
(3) that the person has a right to consult with an attorney but that this
right is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay admin-
istration of the test or the person will be deemed to have refused the
test, and
(4) that after submitting to testing, the person has the right to have ad-
ditional tests made by a person of his own choosing.
MAwN. STAT. § 169.123 (1978).
115. Id. § 169.121(3). In another significant 1979 DWI case, McIntee v. State,
279 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1979), the court held that a petson whose license has
been revoked for DWI is entitled to a driver's license reinstatement hearing
under the provisions of section 171.19 of the Minnesota Statutes even though he
had waived his right to a prerevocation hearing under the implied consent law.
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courts to stay fines and criminal penalties if the defendant un-
dergoes treatment for chemical dependency.116 In Novak v.
Kirby,"17 the supreme court held that trial courts may stay the
revocation of a driver's license to encourage treatment for alco-
holism.118 The court reasoned that since it had previously char-
acterized license revocation as a criminal penalty,119 the stay
provision applied to revocations as well as to the more tradi-
tional criminal sanctions. In addition, the court determined
that by enacting a statute that requires courts to give consider-
ation to alcohol problem assessments of convicted DWI defend-
ants,120 "the legislature granted the courts additional authority
to assume a more treatment-oriented posture."'121
The court's emphasis on rehabilitation and treatment is
commendable, since punishment of drunken drivers is usually
ineffective. 22 The rehabilitative approach benefits individuals
by forcing them to deal with their drinking problems and
serves the community by reducing the number of problem
drinkers on the highways. Nevertheless, the statute authoriz-
ing stays arguably applies only to fines and imprisonment. 23
Moreover, the staying of fines and prison sentences should
alone provide sufficient incentive for defendants convicted of
DWI to undergo treatment. Staying driver's license revocations
is not only an overly broad incentive for treatment, 2 4 but it
permits individuals with histories of drunken driving to con-
tinue endangering the public safety. Thus, the interests of the
116. MINN. STAT. § 169.121(5) (1978).
117. 287 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1979).
118. Id. at 623. The defendant in Novak was sentenced to imprisonment
and fined, and his driver's license was revoked. In view of the alcohol assess-
ment report, however, the municipal court stayed execution of all three sanc-
tions. The Commissioner of Public Safety nevertheless revoked the
defendant's driver's license pursuant to section 171.17(2) of the Minnesota stat-
utes. 287 N.W.2d at 622.
119. See State v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1975) (li-
cense revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon convic-
tion of a § 169.121 violation") (emphasis in original).
120. Act of April 13, 1976, ch. 298, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 1112 (current version
at Mn . STAT. § 169.126 (1978)).
121. 287 N.W.2d at 623.
122. See Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B_.J. 995, 997,
999 (1968).
123. The dissent in Novak contended that the legislature intended the revo-
cation of drivers' licenses to be "an automatic administrative function" that
cannot be stayed by the courts. 287 N.W.2d at 624 (Otis, J., dissenting).
124. Cf. Cramton, supra note 122, at 999 (it is necessary "to minimize use of
the criminal law and concentrate on civil regulatory approaches with loss of li-
cense as the ultimate penalty").
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community would have been better served by a ruling that trial
courts may stay fines and imprisonment, but not driver's li-
cense revocations.
IV. ENVIRONMENT
In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the consti-
tutionality of two legislative attempts to control solid waste pol-
lution, and interpreted the "historical resources" provision of
the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act.' Although environ-
mentalists may take issue with certain aspects of these deci-
sions, on balance, the court demonstrated a concern for
environmental protection and preservation.
A. SoLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
1. The Package Review Act
The Package Review Act2 empowers the Minnesota Pollu-
tion Control Agency (MPCA) to review innovations in product
packaging so that packaging refuse will not contribute to the
state's solid waste pollution problem. In Can Manufacturer's
Institute, Inc. v. State,3 the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
a commerce clause challenge to both the Act and a number of
regulations enacted by the MPCA in furtherance of the Act.
The court limited the impact of the regulations, however, by
finding that they serve only as "guidelines," by specifying that
the MPCA must give notice to manufacturers before reviewing
their packages, and by broadly interpreting the reach of the
Act's grandfather clause.4 The grandfather clause exempts
from review any package sold at retail prior to passage of the
Act.5
It is well established that a state statute or regulation vio-
lates the commerce clause if the "burden it imposes on [inter-
state] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits" it confers.6 Courts have developed two methods
for making this comparison. The traditional method is a bal-
l. For a brief discussion of other environmental cases decided in 1979, see
note 33 infra.
2. MINN. STAT. § 116F.06 (1978). The Act provides that the Minnesota Pol-
lution Control Agency must review all new or modified containers entering
Minnesota markets.
3. 289 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1979).
4. See id. at 424-26.
5. See MiNN. STAT. § 116F.06(2) (1978). The statute was enacted on May
24, 1973. 289 N.W.2d at 425.
6. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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ancing test: the burden on interstate commerce is "weighed"
against the local benefits generated.7 A less demanding test is
used, however, when the regulation at issue is a safety statute.8
Courts then ask whether the regulatory scheme promotes a le-
gitimate state objective and, if so, whether the regulation's ef-
fect on the specific interest to which it is addressed is
"illusory."9 The court in Can Manufacturer's Institute (CMI)
employed the latter test, concluding that the environmental-
protection objective promoted by the Act is not only legitimate,
but compelling, and that the effect of the regulations on the
specific interest addressed by the Act-statewide solid waste
management-is not illusory.
Although the CMI court noted that the Package Review Act
satisfies the traditional commerce clause balancing test, 0 it
based its holding on the more easily satisfied safety regulation
test. To justify this result, the court stated, without further ex-
planation, that the "environmental interests in this case clearly
involve compelling state interests reasonably analogous to
[those protected by] safety regulations.""I This nexus is not as
close as the court suggests, however, since the cases it cites all
concern regulations designed to safeguard persons against im-
mediate threats of physical harm.12 By choosing the safety reg-
ulation test, the court has signaled that commerce clause
challenges to environmental legislation will have little chance
of success in state courts.
The unsatisfying aspect of CMI is the court's interpretation
of the grandfather clause as exempting from regulation all
packages sold at retail prior to the effective date of the Act,
May 25, 1973, even if the contents of the package have been
changed substantially since that time. This ruling unwisely
curtails the authority of the MPCA. The appropriateness of
particular packaging materials depends on the product that the
7. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-47
(1978) (plurality); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945).
8. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 142 (1968); Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
9. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
10. 289 N.W.2d at 421-22.
11. Id. at 421. See generally Note, State Environmental Protection Legisla-
tion and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1762 (1974).
12. See note 8 supra; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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package contains. 13 A package that has been used for years to
market one item may be wholly unacceptable for marketing a
different item.14 Furthermore, the grandfather clause does not
represent a legislative judgment that all packages sold at retail
before May 25, 1973, are environmentally sound. The clause ob-
viously was intended to shield from unnecessary economic
hardship those manufacturers who had invested considerable
capital in producing a package before there existed any mecha-
nism by which they might determine whether the state consid-
ered the package environmentally deleterious. It is unlikely
that the legislature intended the clause to insulate manufactur-
ers who further diversify the use of such packaging after dis-
covering that the state considers it environmentally offensive.
The legislature should therefore amend the grandfather clause
so that it does not exempt packages whose contents have been
changed substantially since the statutory cut-off date.
2. Ban on Plastic Nonrefillable Milk Cartons
In Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State,'5 the Minnesota
Supreme Court decided that a statute banning plastic (but not
paper) nonrefillable milk cartons violated the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. Reasoning that
plastic containers are no more environmentally damaging than
paper ones and that a ban on plastic nonrefillable containers
would not necessarily increase the use of refillable containers,
the majority held that there was no rational basis for the classi-
fication established by the statute.
The United States Supreme Court has established that a
classification created for economic regulatory purposes violates
equal protection only if it "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective."16 Moreover, the
Court has consistently held that states may take a "one step at
a time" approach to regulating local problems: "States are ac-
13. See Y. Wendt, Damming the Solid Waste Stream 50-51 (Minnesota Pol-
lution Control Agency Staff Report 1975).
14. See id. For example, it may be environmentally acceptable to market
tennis balls in metal cans, but unacceptable to seal potato chips in such con-
tainers.
15. 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.LW. 3625 (1980).
16. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See also Davis v. Davis,
297 Minn. 187, 190, 210 N.W.2d 221, 224 (1973). If any state of facts can reason-
ably be conceived to sustain a statute, a court will generally sustain it, see, e.g.,
Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959); Arens v. Village of Rogers,
240 Minn. 386, 396-97, 61 N.W.2d 508, 516 (1953), unless it is manifestly arbitrary.
See, e.g., Williams v. Rolfe, 262 Minn. 284, 294, 114 N.W.2d 671, 678 (1962).
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corded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies
[and] may implement... regulations that only partially ame-
liorate a perceived evil... deferring complete elimination of
the evil to future regulations."17
Given this doctrinal backdrop, it is clear that the Minnesota
Supreme Court exceeded its authority in Clover Leaf. The ban
on nonrefillable plastic milk containers was not "wholly irrele-
vant" to state environmental objectives; rather, it was a logical
step toward promoting environmentally sound milk contain-
ers-those that can be refilled.18 The legislature banned plastic
nonrefillables to prevent the dairy industry from making the
expensive conversion away from paper nonrefillables. Once
the conversion has occurred, the difficulty of legislating a re-
turn to the use of refillables would substantially increase. 19
Thus, the prohibition of plastic nonrefillables was a legitimate
step in the state's long-term policy of solid waste management.
The Clover Leaf court reasoned that the statute was not a
step toward ameliorating a perceived evil since the "evidence is
conclusive that paper containers are not environmentally supe-
rior to plastic nonfillables."20 In other words, the court found
the statute irrational because its benefits would not manifest
themselves immediately. The Clover Leaf reasoning does not
demonstrate that the ban on plastic nonrefillables is arbitrary
or irrational. Rather it reveals that the court simply disagreed
with a value judgment made by the legislature 2 l--that the pos-
17. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (citations omitted). See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
18. See Remarks of Senators Spear and Luther, Full Senate Floor Discus-
sion, 70th Minnesota Legislature (May 20, 1977), quoted in 289 N.W.2d at 88
(Wahl, J., dissenting). Senator Spear commented:
It is true that our alternative now is not a returnable system in terms
of milk bottles. Hopefully we are eventually going to be able to move
to that kind of system, but we are never going to move to a returnable
system so long as we allow another nonreturnable system with all the
investment and all of the vested interest that is going to involve to be-
gin-
See also American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618,
644-47, 517 P.2d 691, 704 (1974) (court found classification requiring mandatory
deposit on all beverage containers rationally related to goal of diminishing the
amount of solid waste and litter, even though other nonregulated containers
also created solid waste); Note, American Can: Judicial Response to Oregon's
Nonreturnable Container Legislation, 4 EcOLOGY L.Q. 145, 151-54 (1974).
19. See 289 N.W.2d at 86.
20. Id.
21. Justice Wahl noted in her dissent, "[I]t is not for this court 'to judge
the wisdom or desirability of legislative determinations' in this area of eco-
nomic regulation." Id. at 88 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
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sibility of future environmental benefits justifies the imposition
of certain immediate economic burdens. But judging a statute
which arguably confers a long-term benefit to be irrational sim-
ply because it will have no instantaneous salutary effect is pre-
cisely the type of second-guessing that courts reviewing the
constitutionality of economic regulations have long avoided.
B. THE MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RiGHTs ACT: HISTORICAL
RESOURCES
In order to establish a prima facie right to an injunction
under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), a
plaintiff must show (1) that a "protectable natural resource"
exists, and (2) that the activity to be enjoined would result in
the "pollution, impairment, or destruction" of that resource.22
MERA's definition of natural resources includes "historical re-
sources."23 In State by Powderly v. Erickson,24 the Minnesota
Supreme Court decided that MERA's historic resources provi-
sion protected a pair of delapidated row houses which the own-
er had sought to demolish. In determining that the row houses
were of sufficient historical significance to constitute "pro-
tected" resources, the court relied on the federal historic pres-
ervation criteria2 5 and on the expert testimony of the Director
of the Minnesota Historical Society.2 6
Although structurally sound, the row houses were vacant
and had been vandalized, because of their condition, they
posed a threat to public safety. Nevertheless, the court en-
joined the owner from demolishing the row houses because he
had not shown that renovation was an imprudent or unfeasible
alternative. 27 Because the court had no power to force the de-
fendant to renovate the row houses, it recommended that the
297, 303 (1976)). See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1085-86 (1969).
22. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 228, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297
(1973).
23. See MAlw. STAT. § 116B.02(4) (1978).
24. 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979).
25. Id. at 87-88 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 800.10(a) (1978)).
26. See 285 N.W.2d at 88.
27. Under MERA, defendants who do not rebut the plaintiffs prima facie
case, see text accompanying note 22 supra, can avoid an injunction only by
proving that (1) he has no feasible and prudent alternative and (2) the conduct
at issue promotes the general health, safety, and welfare. See MNN. STAT.
§ 116B.04 (1978). There was testimony that the row houses were structurally
sound and that there was grant money available to renovate them. The court
noted that if renovated, the row houses could easily be rented because the
rental market in Red Wing is "tight." 285 N.W.2d at 89.
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city of Red Wing, in which they were located, condemn them. 28
The curious aspect of Powderly is the court's assertion that
demolition cannot be enjoined indefinitely if Red Wing refuses
to condemn and the defendant refuses to renovate the row
houses. 29 It is difficult to see how granting a permanent injunc-
tion would differ functionally from having a government agency
designate the row houses as an historic landmark, yet
landmark preservation schemes have been held constitu-
tional.30 The implication of the Powderly opinion is that a per-
manent injunction would constitute a taking.3 1 But earlier in
the opinion the court had concluded that the prevention of
demolition was not a taking because the units had potential ec-
onomic value as renovated living units.32 Thus, Powderly
leaves unanswered the question whether a taking occurs if a
court enjoins an owner from demolishing a historical resource
that in its current state is of no economic value, and the owner
refuses to make the investment necessary to give the property
value when the court has deemed such an investment to be a
"feasible" alternative.33
28. See 285 N.W.2d at 90-91.
29. See id. at 90. MERA explicitly empowers courts to issue permanent in-
junctions. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.07 (1978).
30. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-38
(1978).
31. The court observed that "where control... of property is for the bene-
fit of the many, it makes sense that the cost of the control... should be borne
by all of the taxpayers and not fall on the few directly affected." 285 N.W.2d at
90-91. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); State v. Johnson,
265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
32. 285 N.W.2d at 90.
33. In another MERA decision, the court held by implication that the pro-
ductive use of farmland-that is, farming-is not a protected resource. See
State v. Minnkota Power Coop., Inc., 281 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1979). In Minnkota,
the court was not presented with the issue whether farmland is a protected
natural resource under MERA. In an earlier case, County of Freeborn v.
Bryson, 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973), the court implied that farmland is
a less important natural resource than marshland, but the question whether
farmland is a protected resource remains open.
The court also handed down its first major decision on the preservation of
wild and scenic rivers. See County of Pine v. State, 280 N.W.2d 625 (Minn.
1979). In County of Pine, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Kettle
River Wild and Scenic Rivers Ordinance, Minn. Reg. N.R. 2300, 6 Minn. Code of
Agency Rules § 1 (1975), finding it to be authorized by the Wild and Scenic Riv-
ers Act, MwN. STAT. § 104.31-40 (1978). The court determined that the Ordi-
nance was a valid exercise of the state's police power, noting that its
underlying purpose of improving aesthetics was legitimate and that it also pro-
moted traditional zoning objectives. See 280 N.W.2d at 629-30.
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V. INSURANCE
In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court increased the notice
requirements for the termination of insurance binders and ex-
panded the scope of an insurer's duty to defend third-party
suits.1
A. TERMINATION OF BINDERS
Absent statutory schemes, 2 insurance binders3 normally
terminate at the expiration of a term specified in the contract,4
at the time the insured receives notice that a formal policy has
been issued,5 or at the end of a reasonable time.6 In Ives v.
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court's tendency to favor the insured party is
illustrated by two other 1979 cases not discussed in text. In McEwen v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 281 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1979), the court held invalid State Farm's
elective procedure for "relating back" the initiation date of an insurance policy
when payment is made late. The court held that the plaintiff had insurance
coverage because the six-month effective period of his policy was determined
not to begin until the date that the late payment was made. In Engel v. Red-
wood County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 281 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1979), the court ex-
tended the definition of "hostile fire" to include fires that burn at their normal
rate and in their proper place but for a substantially longer period of time than
expected.
2. In Minnesota, statutory termination provisions override equitable rules
of termination. Cf. Bacich v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 370, 208 N.W.2d
868 (1973) (insured did not waive statutory right to written notice of cancella-
tion by accepting insurance company's decision to cancel his insurance). See
also 9 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsURANCE LAw § 39:206, at 561-62 (2d ed.
1962).
3. A "binder" is a temporary contract for insurance, see, e.g., Indiana Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Pratt, 177 Minn. 36, 38, 224 N.W. 253, 254 (1929), that binds the issuing
company
to pay insurance should a loss occur pending action upon the applica-
tion and actual issuance of a policy. The purpose of a binder is to pro-
vide temporary insurance pending an inquiry by the insurer as to the
character of the risk and to take the place of a policy until the latter
can be issued.
1 G. CoucH, supra note 2, § 14:26, at 605-06 (2d ed. 1959) (footnote omitted).
4. See, e.g., Richardson v. Brown, 443 F.2d 926, 927 (10th Cir. 1971); Frank
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 310 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
5. See, e.g., Ziegler v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 441 F.2d 869, 873
(8th Cir. 1971); Long v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 257 Mass. 240, 243, 153 N.E. 792, 793
(1926). See generally 9 G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 39:207, at 562-63.
6. See, e.g., Eastern Shore of Va. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kellam, 159 Va. 93, 165
S.E. 637, 640 (1932). See 9 G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 39:211, at 565-66. It is un-
clear whether Minnesota follows the reasonable time termination rule. In Rom-
mel v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 214 Minn. 251, 264, 8 N.W.2d 28, 35 (1943),
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an "oral contract for present insur-
ance" was in force more than six months after its formation because notice of
termination had not been communicated to the insured. Cf. Fintel v. Tri-State
Ins. Co., 281 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1979) (binder effective until insured is notified
of its termination when written clause terminating binder in 30 days was modi-
fied by an oral agreement that binder would continue until policy was accepted
or application was rejected).
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Sunfish Sign Co.,7 the plaintiff, president of Sunfish Sign,
sought workers' compensation benefits for injuries he received
in a work-related accident that occurred in June 1975. On Sep-
tember 12, 1974, Sunfish Sign had procured a binder for several
types of insurance, including workers' compensation. The
binder expressly stated that it would terminate in thirty days.
Within the thirty-day period, policies were formalized for the
other types of insurance specified in the binder, but no work-
ers' compensation policy was issued.8 The Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that the binder covered Ives at the time of
his accident, holding that "insurance coverage provided by a
binder [remains] in effect past its stated termination date
[when] not terminated in accordance with the notice provi-
sions of [section 176.185(1) of the Minnesota Statutes]." 9
Section 176.185(1) requires insurers to give thirty-days
written notice to the insured and the Commissioner of Labor
and Industry before terminating or cancelling a workers' com-
pensation policy. Although section 176.185 makes no reference
to binders, the court in Ives dismissed the insurer's contention
that a written binder is not a "policy" within the meaning of the
statute. The court reasoned that the legislature's intent to pro-
vide continuous compensation coverage'O to workers requires
that the statute be read "as pertaining to all contracts for work-
ers' compensation insurance, whether evidenced by a formal
contract or a binder."1
The court acknowledged that the binder termination re-
quirement of Ives might create administrative difficulties for in-
surance companies,12 but concluded that the benefits resulting
from continuous coverage were overriding. It is questionable,
however, whether such benefits13 actually outweigh the difficul-
7. 275 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 1979).
8. The parties stipulated that the reason for failure to formalize the work-
ers' compensation policy would not be argued on appeal, and the court did not
consider the issue. See id. at 42.
9. Id. at 41 (quoting Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals).
10. Workers' compensation insurance is viewed as so essential that "al-
though it arises from a contract between the employer and the carrier, it cre-
ates a sort of insured status in the employee which comes to have virtually an
independent existence." 4 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 92.20, at 17-3 to 17-4 (1976). The ultimate objective of the workers' compensa-
tion system is to ensure that employees have adequate benefits available to
them. Id. § 92.20, at 17-4. See also Oster v. Riley, 276 Minn. 274, 150 N.W.2d 43
(1967); Nehring v. Bast, 258 Minn. 193, 202, 103 N.W.2d 368, 375 (1960).
11. 275 N.W.2d at 44.
12. See id.
13. It should be noted that in Minnesota an employee rdceives compensa-
tion from a special compensation fund if his employer is uninsured. See MmN.
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ties created by the termination requirement. In Ives, strict
compliance with the statute would have required the insurance
company to send notice both to the insured and to the Commis-
sioner of Labor and Industry on the day the binder was is-
sued.14 Moreover, if taken literally, Ives might also require that
insurance companies, to avoid liability under workers' compen-
sation binders that by their own terms have expired long ago,
to send out notice of termination for every workers' compensa-
tion binder they have ever issued.15 Furthermore, by extending
insurance policy notice requirements to binders, the court has
raised the possibility that it may apply other insurance policy
requirements, such as good cause termination, to binders.16
The legislature should therefore act to clarify the binder issue
and eliminate the potential for liability brought about by the
Ives decision.
B. DUTY TO DEFEND THIRD-PARTY Surrs
In Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co.,17
the insured, Lanoue, owned a neighborhood grocery store in
which he employed O'Brien, a minor. O'Brien took some beer
from the store's cooler and a bottle of whiskey from Lanoue's
locked office and delivered these beverages to another minor,
Anderson. After becoming intoxicated from consuming some of
the liquor, Anderson was involved in a one-car automobile acci-
dent. Anderson's parents sued Lanoue, alleging a dramshop vi-
olation-a cause of action not covered by either of Lanoue's
insurance policies.18 When Lanoue tendered defense of the
suit to his insurance companies, both refused to defend even
STAT. § 176.183(1) (Supp. 1979). The state can sue uninsured employers to in-
demnify the fund in such cases. Id.
14. The statute does not require the insurer to file notice of coverage until
10 days after the policy is issued. See MIN. STAT. § 176.185(1) (Supp. 1979).
Thus, if the statute is applied to binders with 30-day termination dates, insurers
must fie notice of termination before they are required to file notice of the
existence of the binder. Moreover, it is doubtful that an employer's awareness
of an impending termination will be heightened by his receiving notice of ter-
mination on the same day the binder is issued, at least in cases such as Ives in
which the binder contains an identical notice of termination.
15. Although it is unlikely that courts would allow this result, the absence
of a reasonable time termination rule in Minnesota, see note 6 supra, certainly
makes it possible.
16. For example, if the liberal wording in Ives were applied to Minnesota's
automobile insurance statutes, an insurer might be required to give 60-days no-
tice, along with a statement of good cause, before terminating a common auto-
mobile insurance binder. See Mum. STAT. § 65B.17 (Supp. 1979).
17. 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979).
18. Lanoue carried both business and homeowner's insurance.
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though they were aware of the facts surrounding the incident.
Lanoue then brought an action for declaratory judgment to de-
termine whether his insurance companies had a duty to de-
fend. Shortly before trial on the declaratory judgment action,
however, Anderson's parents amended their complaint to in-
clude allegations of negligence. Both insurance companies of-
fered to defend the negligence claim, and the trial court
concluded that neither insurance company had a duty to de-
fend the initial dramshop action and that Lanoue could not col-
lect attorney's fees in the declaratory judgment action.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
insurance companies had a duty to defend Lanoue against the
dramshop complaint because the companies were aware that
the facts established a potential negligence claim, which would
be covered by the policies.19 The court further held that La-
noue could recover attorney's fees in the declaratory judgment
action.20
Under the most widely accepted rule, an insurance com-
pany has a duty to defend if the allegations in the complaint
against the insured unambiguously support recovery under the
coverage of the policy.21 In Minnesota, however, the duty to de-
fend is broader, extending to situations in which the insurer
has knowledge of facts that arguably bring the cause of action
within the coverage of the policy even though the complaint
fails to allege such facts. 22 The court in Lanoue acknowledged
that neither of the insured's policies covered dramshop claims,
but emphasized that the insurers must nevertheless prove that,
due to policy exclusions, no duty to defend existed.23 The court
noted that all the facts known to the insurance companies,
19. See 278 N.W.2d at 54.
20. Id. at 55.
21. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932,
936 (8th Cir. 1978). See generally 14 G. COUGH, supra note 2, § 51:40, at 532-35
(2d ed. 1965); Note, Liability Insurance Policy Defenses and the Duty to Defend,
68 HARV. L. REV. 1436 (1955); Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liabil-
ity Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734, 734-38 (1966). Courts following this
rule usually emphasize the contractual nature of the duty to defend and the po-
tential for unlimited liability that exists when the duty is not rigorously de-
fined.
22. See Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
309 Minn. 14, 17-18, 242 N.W.2d 840, 842 (1976); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett,
307 Minn. 72, 75-76, 240 N.W.2d 310, 312 (1976); Crum v. Anchor Cas. Co., 264
Minn. 378, 386-90, 119 N.W.2d 703, 709-10 (1963). But see Prahm v. Rupp Constr.
Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979) (insurer need not retain counsel to defend in-
sured but must reimburse insured for expense of engaging counsel himself).
23. See 278 N.W.2d at 52-53; F.D. Chapman Constr. Co. v. Glens Falls Ins.
Co., 297 Minn. 406, 408, 211 N.W. 2d 871, 872 (1973).
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whether alleged in the complaint or not, had to fall within pol-
icy exclusions in order for the companies to avoid their duty to
defend.24 Concluding that the companies had failed to meet
their burden of proof on this point, the court entered judgment
for the cost of the defense of the dramship claim.
Since a negligence claim was eventually asserted in La-
noue, the facts known to the companies apart from the original
complaint arguably established coverage under their policies.
The court strained the Minnesota rule to its limits, however,
when it found that the facts eventually alleged in the negli-
gence claim were included in the coverage of both policies.2 5 It
was certainly unreasonable to expect an insurance company to
have anticipated a negligence claim based on theft of beer from
the store's cooler and liquor from Lanoue's locked office.2 6 Ap-
parently, the Lanoue court's objective was to introduce a
method for spreading the cost of litigation in liability suits. As
a result, it appears that in Minnesota, liability insurers must
now base their rates on the assumption that they must defend
any suit that does not fall exactly within the exclusion catego-
ries of their liability policies. 27
The Lanoue court's second holding-permitting the recov-
ery of attorney's fees in declaratory actions brought to deter-
mine an insurer's duty to defend-clarifies a previously
unsettled point of law. Generally, a court may grant attorney's
fees only when fees have been contracted for or are mandated
by statute.28 In a 1966 decision, Morrison v. Swenson,29 the
court created an exception to this rule for declaratory actions
24. See 278 N.W.2d at 53.
25. Lanoue's homeowner policy excluded coverage of damage arising on
"other premises," and was plainly drafted to avoid liability for accidents arising
beyond the confines of Lanoue's home. None of the alcohol stolen from Lanoue
had any connection with his home.
26. Justice Sheran characterized the negligence claim as 'farfetched." 278
N.W.2d at 56 (Sheran, C.J., dissenting).
27. In previous cases applying the Minnesota rule, only twice did the court
find a duty to defend on facts outside the complaint. See F.D. Chapman Co. v.
Glen Falls Ins. Co., 297 Minn. 406, 211 N.W.2d 871 (1973); Crum v. Anchor Cas.
Co., 264 Minn. 378, 119 N.W.2d 703 (1963). In each of the cases, the existence of
the claim was clear. The Lanoue court's willingness to require an insurance
company to defend on the basis of arguably excludable facts resembles the po-
sition taken by the California Supreme Court in Gray v. Zurich, 65 Cal. 2d 263,
419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). In Gray, the court used a "potential for
liability" test. The court admitted that the test could not be overcome unless
the policy had terminated or the claim involved intentional tort conduct. See
Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.CJ.A.
L REv. 1328, 1330-37 (1967).
28. See 278 N.W.2d at 54.
29. 274 Minn. 127, 142 N.W.2d 640 (1966).
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brought to determine an insurer's defense duty. Later deci-
sions30 limited this exception to such an extent, however, that
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sub-
sequently overruled Morrison in Western Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Polar Panel C0.31 The court in Lanoue expressly repudiated
the Western Casualty decision and reinstated the Morrison ex-
ception. 32 The Lanoue court's conclusion that the refusal to al-
low attorney's fees under these circumstances constitutes
deprivation of a contract right is persuasive.33
VI. MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION
A. ALCOHOLISM EXCEPTION TO NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Under Minnesota's no-fault divorce law,' a court must grant
a request for marriage dissolution if it finds that there has been
an "irretrievable breakdown" of the marital relationship.2 In
Hagerty v. Hagerty,3 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
there can be an "irretrievable breakdown" of the marital rela-
tionship based primarily on one spouse's alcoholism, even
though alcoholism is a treatable disease. The court recognized
that there were "compelling arguments" in favor of requiring
alcoholism treatment before granting a dissolution, but empha-
sized that Minnesota's marriage dissolution law does not re-
quire courts affirmatively to encourage reconciliation.4
According to the court, the determination of whether a marital
breakdown is irretrievable must be premised on the existing
state of the marriage.
This rule is sensible when it is the nonalcoholic spouse
30. For a discussion of the developments in Minnesota law on this point,
see Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 429, 431 (1978).
31. 457 F.2d 957, 961-63 (8th Cir. 1972).
32. The Lanoue court noted that the earlier Minnesota cases had limited
the exception to declaratory judgment actions for breach of a contract to de-
fend third-party actions that did not end in default. See 278 N.W.2d at 54-55.
33. See 7 C. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4691, at 283 (Berdal
ed. 1979), quoted in Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d at 55.
See also 14 G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 51:53, at 99-100 (Supp. 1976).
1. MImN. STAT. §§ 518.001-.66 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
2. Id. § 518.06(1) (Supp. 1979). The statute does not differentiate between
irretrievable breakdown caused by illness and that resulting from any other
cause.
3. 281 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979).
4. Id. at 389. Some jurisdictions statutorily require courts to attempt rec-
onciliation. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-360 (1978); N.IL REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:7-b (Supp. 1979). Cf. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DrvORCE ACT § 305(b) (2)
(1970) (court may continue proceedings and may suggest that the parties seek
counseling).
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who claims that the marriage is irretrievable. In Hagerty, how-
ever, it was the nonalcoholic spouse who claimed that the mar-
riage could be saved. Since alcoholism is treatable, it might
have been more sensible for the court to estop the alcoholic
spouse from claiming that his alcoholism had caused an irre-
trievable breakdown of the marriage-at least until he had un-
dergone treatment unsuccessfully.5 But rather than create a
distinction based on which of the spouses claimed that the
marriage was irretrievable, the court simply refused to recog-
nize an alcoholism exception. Although such an exception
would have encouraged marital stability and alcoholism treat-
ment, the court's decision in Hagerty cannot really be criti-
cized. If the court had recognized an alcoholism exception, it
would have reintroduced the problems that the legislature had
intended to eliminate through no-fault divorce: adversarial dis-
solution proceedings with parties fitting themselves into judi-
cially defined categories.6
B. REDUCTION IN ALIMONY DUE TO MERETRICIOUS
RELATIONSHIP
In Abbott v. Abbott,7 the Minnesota Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a meretricious relationship8 that produced a posi-
tive change in the economic circumstances of the party
receiving alimony justifies a reduction in alimony. After paying
alimony of $500 per month for ten years, Lowell Abbott peti-
tioned the court for modification of his obligation because his
former wife was living with and being partially supported by
another man.9 The trial court reduced the alimony, citing both
the substantial change in economic circumstances and the
existence of a meretricious relationship.
In an earlier decision, Sieber v. Sieber,O the court had
ruled that the existence of a meretricious relationship does not
justify termination of alimonyl' except to the extent that the
5. Prior to the dissolution hearing, Mrs. Hagerty sought and was refused
an order dismissing the dissolution petition unless her husband sought alcohol-
ism treatment within six months. See 281 N.W.2d at 387.
6. See id. at 389.
7. 282 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 1979).
8. A meretricious relationship is one based on sexual conduct that has
traditionally been considered immoral. See Sieber v. Sieber, 258 N.W.2d 754,
757 (Minn. 1977).
9. See 282 N.W.2d at 564. Abbott's former wife had sold the home that she
was awarded in the divorce settlement and had purchased another one jointly
with her new sexual partner.
10. 258 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1977).
11. While some older decisions held that sexual misconduct is a factor in
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relationship "improve[s] an ex-spouse's economic well-be-
ing."' 2 In Abbott, the court found that the meretricious rela-
tionship resulted in reduced heating, tax, and mortgage
expenses for Abbott's former wife, and "support[ed] a finding
of a substantial change in [her] financial circumstances.' 3 Ab-
bott illustrates that the protection seemingly given meretri-
cious relationships in Sieber will seldom be applicable in fact.
Because a meretricious relationship will almost always im-
prove the economic circumstances of the party receiving ali-
mony, the mere existence of such a relationship will justify
some reduction in alimony. This result is consistent with the
purposes underlying alimony, since need is a primary element
in the determination of alimony.14
VII. PROPERTY
In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided two cases
that demonstrate its willingness to go beyond the narrow con-
fines of common law property doctrines.1
determining whether the court should modify alimony, none of them ruled that
postdivorce sexual misconduct per se justifies modification. See id. at 758.
12. Id. Cf. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsnc RELATIONS § 14.9(6) (1968) ("if she
is living with another man and being supported by him, she should be no more
entitled to continue receiving alimony than if she had remarried"). Mainte-
nance awards are subject to modification by the court upon a showing of mate-
rial change of circumstances. MImN. STAT. § 518.64(2) (1978); see Kerr v. Kerr,
309 Minn. 124, 243 N.W.2d 313 (1976).
13. 282 N.W.2d at 565. Despite the urging of the trial court, see Appellant's
Brief and Appendix app., at A-22 to -29, Abbott v. Abbott, 282 N.W.2d 561 (Minn.
1979), the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to overrule Sieber, reasoning that
alimony is a substitute for the husband's obligation to support his wife and
should terminate only in the case of legal remarriage. See 282 N.W.2d at 565-66.
This position is logically consistent with no-fault marriage dissolution, in which
marital misconduct is not a factor in determining maintenance awards and
property dispositions. MIN. STAT. §§ 518.552(2), .58 (Supp. 1979). The result is
disturbing, however, since it encourages cohabitation rather than marriage.
The legislature should therefore consider a statutorily imposed presumption
that voluntary cohabitation produces a decreased need for support. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5(a) (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(b)
(Supp. 1979); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 248 (McKinney 1977).
14. See Cooper v. Cooper, 298 Minn. 247, 252, 214 N.W.2d 682, 686 (1974)
("the needs of the wife as well as the income of the husband are to be taken
into consideration in awarding alimony"); MiNm. STAT. §§ 518.54-.55 (1978 &
Supp. 1979).
1. In another 1979 case dealing with real property, the supreme court de-
cided that under section 505.14 of the Minnesota Statutes, a property owner
may petition to have a restrictive covenant removed from his land. Batinich v.
Harvey, 277 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1979). Section 505.14 provides that a "district
court may vacate or alter all, or any part of [a] plat, and adjudge the title to all
streets, alleys, and public grounds to be in the persons entitled thereto." MMN.
STAT. § 505.14 (1978). The covenant in Batinich had nothing to do with the plat
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A. LAND SALES CONTRACTS: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Courts ordinarily grant the remedy of specific performance
when a contract to convey real estate is breached by the gran-
tor.2 Trial courts, however, may deny specific performance if it
will produce unconscionable or inequitable results. 3 In Hilton
v. Nelsen,4 the Mlinnesota Supreme Court declined to order
specific performance when there had been a breach of a con-
tract to sell farmland to an investor. Employing the totality of
circumstances test, the court noted four factors that justified
the lower court's decision not to grant the remedy: the pur-
chaser intended to rent the property to a third person rather
than farm or homestead it himself;5 the contract contained ele-
ments of unfairness and overreaching 6 the seller had misun-
derstood the basic terms of the contract;7 and, at the time of
the action, legal and equitable title to the property was held by
a third party.8
Although the court limited its decision "to the narrow facts
presented,"9 Hilton represents an expansion of the equitable
exception to the rule of specific performance of land contracts.
Rather than mechanically assuming that the parcel of land was
"unique," the court utilized a more functional approach, exam-
or the location of public grounds and alleys. Rather, it restricted the land in
question to residential uses. The court acknowledged that section 505.14 was
not intended to be used to remove restrictive covenants. 277 N.W.2d at 358.
2. The traditional justification for this practice is based on the assumption
that land is a unique, not fungible, commodity. Therefore, the remedy at law,
damages, is inadequate. See generally Gethsemane Lutheran Church v. Zacho,
258 Minn. 438, 443, 104 N.W.2d 645, 648 (1960); 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 1143 (1964); REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 360 (1932).
3. See, e.g., Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 136, 94
N.W.2d 273, 284 (1959); Twin City Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Johnson, 194 Minn. 1, 7,
259 N.W. 551, 553 (1935).
4. 283 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979).
5. Id. at 881.
6. Id. The court found three elements of unfairness: the contract did not
provide mutuality of remedy, it allowed unilateral termination by the pur-
chaser, and its terms unreasonably delayed payment of principal. Id. at 881-82.
See also Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 204 Minn. 300, 308, 283 N.W. 561, 567
(1939) (mutuality of remedy and performance are elements to be considered in
determining whether contract should be specifically enforced).
7. 283 N.W.2d at 882-83. This factor has not always been considered deter-
minative by the court. See Gethsemane Lutheran Church v. Zacho, 258 Minn.
438, 442, 104 N.W.2d 645, 648 (1960) (unilateral mistake normally insufficient to
support denial of specific performance).
8. 283 N.W.2d at 883.
9. Id. The court also stated, "We do not mean to suggest that any one of
the factors discussed above is necessarily sufficient to render specific perform-
ance inequitable. Considering them together, however, we feel compelled to
the decision we have reached." Id.
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ining the facts to determine whether specific performance was
necessary. The court found that equitable considerations'O jus-
tified the result in Hilton. More important, however, was the
court's explicit recognition that in certain circumstances, par-
cels of land are fungible. The court noted that "any equivalent
parcel of Minnesota farmland would [have served the pur-
chaser's] investment purposes"" and that damages would
therefore adequately compensate him.12 This aspect of Hilton
goes beyond the traditional equitable exception to the specific
performance rule because the court explicitly diminished the
weight accorded the uniqueness rationale.13 Thus, the Hilton
decision might indicate that the court is now prepared to recog-
nize a new exception based primarily on the defendant's show-
ing that there are available to the plaintiff a reasonable number
of "equivalent" parcels of land-in other words, that the rem-
edy at law is adequate.14
B. ADJOINING LANDOWNERS: ENCROACHMENT
Courts normally refuse to condone any landowner conduct
that encroaches upon the property of an adjacent landowner.15
10. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra. See also Boulevard Plaza
Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 135-36, 94 N.W.2d 273, 283 (1959) (specific per-
formance of contract for the sale of farmland denied when "laches, lack of good
faith, and nonperformance on the part of the plaintiff" were present).
11. 283 N.W.2d at 881.
12. Id. at 883-84. A minority of jurisdictions will only award damages when
the purchaser bought the land for speculation or has already resold it to an-
other person. See generally note 14 infra.
13. The traditional formulation of the equitable exception to specific per-
formance does not in strict logic diminish the force of the uniqueness rationale.
Rather, it simply recognizes that in'certain circumstances the actual equities of
the seller may be so compelling that they outweigh even the theoretical equi-
ties of the purchaser arising out of the uniqueness of the land. By suggesting a
situation in which it will give "less weight" to the theoretical equities of the
purchaser, see 283 N.W.2d at 881, the court in Hilton may have implied that in
this type of situation it will sanction the denial of specific performance even if
the seller's actual equities are not particularly compelling.
14. Other courts have denied specific performance when the uniqueness of
the land was not at issue. See Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 434
(1966) (specific performance of contract to sell farmland denied when land was
not unique and sales of similar land were frequent); Centex Homes Corp. v.
Boag, 128 N.J. Super. 385, 393, 320 A.2d 194, 198-99 (1974) (specific performance
of contract to sell condominium denied when unit in question was identical to
hundreds of other units for sale). See generally Comment, Vendor's Action to
Specifically Enforce Purchase Contract of Condominium Denied, 48 TEMPLE
L.Q. 847 (1975); Comment, Vendor of Condominium Unit Has No Right to Spe-
cific Performance of Sales Agreement Breached by Purchaser, 43 U. CwN. L
REv. 935 (1974).
15. See McKee v. Fields, 187 Or. 323, 326, 210 P.2d 115, 116 (1949). See gener-
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In Olson v. Lindberg,16 the defendant inadvertently constructed
his home so that it extended four feet onto the land of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff sought an injunction requiring removal
of the encroaching structure or, in the alternative, damages for
lost use of his land. Although either remedy was appropriate
under existing law,' 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's order requiring the plaintiff to sell the affected
property to the defendant for its reasonable value.18
The court in Olson acted wisely in denying the injunction
because the encroachment was inadvertent 9 and the damages
to the plaintiff were far less than the cost of removing the en-
croaching structure.20 By forcing the plaintiff to sell his land,
however, the court may have established an undesirable prece-
dent.2 1 Olson permits a landowner to acquire adjacent land be-
cause he negligently constructed an encroaching structure.
Further expansion of the remedy granted in Olson would
amount to the judicial creation of a private right of eminent do-
main2 2 and, since it would inure to the benefit of negligent par-
ties, it might significantly diminish the incentive for persons to
exercise due care in discerning property boundaries before
building permanent structures. If ordering removal of an en-
ally 1 AM. JuR. 2d Adjoining Landowners § 118 (1962); 2 C.J.S. Adjoining Land-
owners § 40 (1962).
16. 286 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1979).
17. See, e.g., Legendre v. Harris, 125 Ill. App. 2d 76, 85, 260 N.E.2d 391, 395
(1970); 1 AM. JuR. 2d, supra note 15, §§ 121, 128; 2 C.J.S., supra note 15, §§ 44-47.
18. See 286 N.W.2d at 692. The value of the land was set at $1,000. Id. The
court also affirmed the trial court's award of an additional $1,500 in expert wit-
ness fees, noting that it was in excess of the customary fee but appeared to fur-
ther compensate the plaintiffs and was "wholly proper." Id. at 693.
19. Other courts have recognized that a distinction should be made be-
tween willful and inadvertent encroachments. See generally 1 AM. Jur. 2d,
supra note 15, § 134.
20. The land encroached upon was swamp land, and the plaintiffs attorney
admitted that the actual damage was small and therefore suggested that the
court award equitable damages in lieu of an injunction or actual damages. See
Letter from C. Douglas Norberg to Judge C. Luther Eckman (May 12, 1978)
(copy on file with the Minnesota Law Review). Other courts have recognized
the difficulties with granting an injunction when the value of the affected prop-
erty is much lower than the cost of removing the encroachment. See Easter v.
Dundalk Holding Co., 233 Md. 174, 179, 195 A.2d 682, 685 (1963) (damages are ap-
propriate remedy when cost of removing encroachment is greater than diminu-
tion in market value of land encroached upon); Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111,
269 Or. 174, 186, 523 P.2d 1018, 1024 (1974) (injunction denied when there was
little damage to plaintiff and it would have worked great hardship on defend-
ant). See generally D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 5.6, at 356
(1973).
21. But cf. Graven v. Backus, 163 N.W.2d 320, 326-29 (N.D. 1968) (court or-
der effectively forced sale, but at much greater than reasonable value).
22. See Tauscher v. Andruss, 240 Or. 304, 309, 401 P.2d 40, 42 (1965).
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croaching structure would be unjust, the appropriate remedy is
to award a rental fee for an easement or equitable damages in
lieu of an injunction.23
VIII. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
A. BODING ARBIRATION
In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court twice interpreted
the binding arbitration provisions' of Minnesota's Public Em-
ployment Labor Relations Act (PELRA).2 Both decisions ad-
dress the issue of whether a legislative body can modify
binding arbitration awards made to public employees.
City of Richfield v. Local 1215, International Association of
Fire Fighters,3 involved contract negotiations between a munic-
ipality and its fire fighters. When the negotiations reached an
impasse, the fire fighters petitioned for submission of the dis-
pute to binding arbitration under PELRA.4 After the arbitra-
tion panel made its award, the municipality brought suit
challenging PELRA's compulsory binding arbitration provi-
sions as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the provisions as a
proper delegation of legislative power5 because they contain
23. See, e.g., Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111, 269 Or. 174, 186-88, 523 P.2d 1018,
1024-25 (1974) (court ordered partial removal of encroachment, payment of
damages, and granted easement). See also Anm. STAT. § 559.09 (1978).
1. MIN. STAT. §§ 179.68-.72 (1978). Under the Minnesota Public Employ-
ment Labor Relations Act, the Bureau of Mediation Services certifies when an
impasse in labor negotiations has been reached. Id. § 179.69(3). If an impasse
has been reached and the employees involved are not "essential," see id.
§ 179.63(11), the employer may submit the dispute to binding arbitration. Id.
§ 179.69(3). If, however, the employer refuses to submit the disputed issue to
binding arbitration, or after accepting arbitration, the employer rejects the arbi-
trator's decision, PELRA grants non-essential employees the right to strike. Id.
§ 179.64(7). If the employees are "essential," see id. § 179.63(11), binding arbi-
tration is compulsory when requested by either party. Since essential employ-
ees, unlike non-essential employees, can force the employer to accept
arbitration, essential employees are not permitted to strike. See id. § 179.64(1),
(7).
2. Id. §§ 179.61-.77. For a brief discussion of PELRA's history and develop-
ment, see Comment, Labor Law: Sympathy Strikes Under the Minnesota Pub-
lic Employment Relations Act, 63 MNm. L. REv. 1023, 1024-29 (1979). For a more
detailed historical perspective, see Note, The Minnesota Public Employment La-
bor Relations Act of 1971: Another Public Employment Experiment, 57 Mnm. L.
REV. 134 (1972). For PELRA cases decided in 1979 but not discussed in the text
of this section, see note 21 infra.
3. 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979).
4. Fire fighters are essential employees under PELRA, see MIN. STAT.
§ 179.63(11) (1978), and may demand binding arbitration. See note 1 supra.
5. The court relied on Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530 (1949),
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numerous restrictions and policy statements that limit the dis-
cretion of arbitrators.6 Moreover, the court found that the poli-
cies underlying the binding arbitration provisions are more
compelling than the interest that municipalities have in retain-
ing final control over wage settlements with their employees.7
In addition, the court in Richfield specifically rejected a propo-
sal that would have required local governments to approve
PELRA arbitration awards.8
In contrast to the reasoning it displayed in Richfield, the
court in Minnesota Education Association (MEA) v. State9 con-
cluded that the state's interest in exercising final control over
arbitration awards made to state employees is of paramount
importance.' 0 The MEA litigation arose after salary negotia-
tions between the state-employed faculty of Minnesota's com-
munity colleges" and the State Commissioner of Personnel
in determining the scope of valid delegations. See 276 N.W.2d at 45. In Lee, the
court held that the legislature may delegate powers that are not purely legisla-
tive and "which it might properly, but cannot conveniently or advantageously,
do itself." 228 Minn. at 112-13, 36 N.W.2d at 538. Thus, even broad discretionary
powers can be delegated if the law "furnishes a reasonably clear policy or stan-
dard of action which controls and guides the administrative officers." Id. See
Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. Local 113, 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16
(1954). But see Campbell, Salt Lake City v. International Association of
Firefighters: A Responsive Analysis and Proposal for Public Sector Bargaining
in Utah, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 457 (analyzing a Utah case that struck down a stat-
ute similar to PELRA as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative author-
ity).
6. The purpose of the non-delegation doctrine is to prevent administra-
tors from having unguided and uncontrolled discretionary power. See gener-
ally 1 K. DAviS, ADmnsmTRATrvE LAw TREATISE § 3, at 206 (2d ed. 1978). The
court found the discretion of arbitrators to be sufficiently limited by PELRA's
provisions requiring that an impasse be reached, MiNN. STAT. § 179.69(3) (1978);
that the jurisdiction of arbitration be limited to specific issues, id. § 179.72(7);
that the arbitrators consider the financial impact of an award on the commu-
nity, id.; and that the arbitrators' decision not violate any city ordinance or
charter provision, id. The court also noted that arbitration awards are subject
to judicial review. See 276 N.W.2d at 46-47.
7. See 276 N.W.2d at 46.
8. See id. at 48.
9. 282 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3534 (1980).
10. See id. at 918-19.
11. Community college faculty are non-essential employees under PELRA.
See note 1 supra.
During the 1980 session, the legislature enacted several amendments to
PELRA that affect the way in which non-essential employees' right to strike
matures. Act of Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 617, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1365 (West).
For further discussion of binding arbitration for educators, see Lentz, Can
Compulsory Arbitration Work in Education Collective Bargaining? A Second
Look: The Teacher Organization Perspective, 9 J.L & EDUC. 85 (1980); Rynecki,
Can Compulsory Arbitration Work in Education Collective Bargaining? A Sec-
ond Look: Management Advocate's View, 9 J.L. & EDuc. 93 (1980); Rynecki,
Can Compulsory Arbitration Work in Education: A Management Perspective, 4
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reached an impasse. The parties submitted the dispute to bind-
ing arbitration under PELRA. After the arbitration panel made
its award, the legislature reduced the wage "agreement"12 com-
ponent of the award. The faculty brought suit challenging the
legislature's action both as an unfair labor practice and as a vi-
olation of equal protection. The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that PELRA authorizes the legislature to review arbitra-
tion awards made to state employees and that such review
does not deny state employees equal protection even though
arbitration awards made to employees of local governments are
not subject to similar review.'3
As interpreted in Richfield and MEA, PELRA's binding ar-
bitration provisions require local governments to comply with
awards made to their employees but permit the legislature to
reject or modify awards made to state employees. Although
this result is consistent with the language of PELRA,14 the rea-
soning employed by the court in these cases is inconsistent.
Furthermore, the result in MEA could undermine the good
faith bargaining process that PELRA was intended to establish
for negotiations between the state and its employees.
The apparent contradiction between Richfield and MEA-
that the state has a strong fiscal interest in controlling the
wages of its employees while local governments have no simi-
lar interest-can be reconciled by examining the different role
that the state played in each case. In Richfield, the legislature
was acting as a regulator of general employment practices; in
MEA, the state was acting as an employer. The state has dele-
gated to arbitrators its power to regulate the wages of local gov-
ernment employees, but has chosen to retain the power to
regulate the wages of its own employees.
Even though these two cases can be reconciled, the MEA
decision undermines the policies supporting binding arbitra-
J.L. & EDUC. 645 (1975). See generally Begin, Settle & Berke-Weiss, Patterns of
Faculty Collective Bargaining in Community Colleges, 9 RuT.-CAm. .J. 699
(1978); Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN.
L. REv. 183, 245-74 (1980).
12. Section 179.74(5) of the Minnesota Statutes requires that "agreements"
establishing wage and fringe benefits be submitted to the legislature. The
plaintiffs in MEA argued that in their case there was no "agreement" since
binding arbitration occurred only after failure to agree. Under this analysis,
only negotiated settlements could be submitted to the legislature for approval
or modification. The court dismissed this argument. See 282 N.W.2d at 917-18.
13. See 282 N.W.2d at 919.
14. PELRA mandates binding arbitration for local governments, lum.
STAT. § 179.68(2) (9) (1978), but allows the state legislature to review arbitration
awards made to state employees, id. § 179.74(5).
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tion between the state and its employees.15 The opportunity
for binding arbitration ensures that should the parties reach an
impasse, the dispute will be resolved expeditiously without a
strike or interruption of services.16 If the legislature can over-
ride binding arbitration awards, non-essential employees will
be unlikely to compromise during the negotiation process since
they could face even further cuts by the legislature.17 Thus, ar-
bitrators might be faced with parties' taking highly polarized
positions. Moreover, the parties might not negotiate in good
faith, and this would delay the prompt and fair settlement of
disputes. Non-essential employees may even forgo voluntary
binding arbitration altogether if the process continually proves
to be nothing more than an inconsequential prelude to unilat-
eral settlement of wage disputes by the legislature. Therefore,
the MEA decision could increase the threat of illegal strikes de-
spite PELRA's express purpose of avoiding such strikes.18
It seems incongruous to treat employees differently de-
pending on whether they are employed by local or state gov-
ernments. Because arbitrators are required to consider the
financial impact of their decision on the community,19 binding
arbitration is unlikely to harm the state any more than it would
harm local government units. Because of the policies underly-
ing binding arbitration and the similarity of the impact it would
have on state and local governments, the legislature2O should
either accept the final nature of binding arbitration awards
made to state employees or develop a different mechanism for
resolving contract disputes that would apply equally to both
state and local employees.21
15. PELRA mandates good faith bargaining. "'Meet and negotiate' means
the performance of the mutual obligations of public employers and the exclu-
sive representatives of public employees to meet at reasonable times ... with
the good faith intent of entering into an agreement with respect to terms and
conditions of employment ..... " MmN. STAT. § 179.63(16) (1978) (emphasis ad-
ded). For policy arguments against third-party binding arbitration for public
employees, see Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspec-
tive, 83 YALE LiT. 1156, 1188-89, 1200 (1974).
16. See Note, supra note 2, at 174.
17. Cf. Lentz, supra note 11, at 90 (author argues that this impasse prob-
lem inheres in 'final offer" bargaining approach).
18. Cf. Note, supra note 2, at 174 (discussion of factors that tend to under-
cut the strike-avoidance policy of PELRA).
19. See Min. STAT. § 179.72(7) (1978). Arbitrators are also required to
meet minimum professional standards. Id. § 179.72(5).
20. The Legislature in its 1980 session extensively amended PELRA but
left unchanged the provision authorizing legislative review of binding arbitra-
tion awards made to state employees. Act of Apr. 24, 1980, ch. 617, § 39, 1980
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1382 (West).
21. The Minnesota Supreme Court decided two other PELRA cases in
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IX. TORTS
A. DUTY TO WARN: OBvIous DANGERS
There is normally no duty to warn persons of dangers that
are known or should be obvious to them.' A duty to warn may
exist, however, when a party has special knowledge of a hazard
or has a special relationship2 with the injured party, regardless
of whether the injured party failed to protect himself from an
obvious hazard. In Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,3 a products
liability suit, the plaintiff lost part of his right arm while manu-
ally unclogging a forage harvester without first shutting off the
power. Because clogging is a normal occurrence in the use of
such machinery and can be corrected only by hand, the manu-
facturer posted several warnings on the harvester admonishing
operators to shut off power before reaching into the machine.4
None of these warnings elaborated on the precise nature of the
danger facing someone who attempted to unclog a harvester
while the power was still on. Although the plaintiff had disre-
garded the warnings, the jury found the defendant manufac-
turer fifty-one percent negligent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a jury
could find the warnings inadequate because they did not detail
the particular manner in which injuries might occur.5 The
1979. In Hennepin County Court Employees Group v. Public Employment Re-
lations Bd., 274 N.W.2d 492 (Minn. 1979), the court held clerical workers in the
court system to be "essential employees" under section 179.63(11) of the Min-
nesota Statutes because they "are indispensible to the prompt and orderly
functioning of the judicial system." 274 N.W.2d at 495. In State Employees Lo-
cal 66 v. St. Louis County Bd. of Comm'rs, 281 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1979), the
court held that a contract dispute could not be settled through a grievance pro-
cedure until a court had determined which of two competing unions was the
exclusive bargaining agent of the employee organization.
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 96, at 649 (4th ed.
1971).
2. Traditionally recognized "special relations" include carrier and passen-
ger, innkeeper and guest, husband and wife, and parent and child. See id. § 56,
at 341-42.
3. 289 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1979).
4. The harvester's internal operating components consisted of such intrin-
sically dangerous devices as moving feed rollers, gathering chains, and cutting
knives, all of which operated at high speed. On the access door to the feed roll-
ers, where clogs normally occur, there was a sign warning operators to "KEEP
AWAY FROM ROLLS UNLESS POWER IS OFF." Another sign warned opera-
tors to be careful to disconnect power before unclogging, and to keep hands,
feet, and clothing away from power-driven parts. Id. at 458.
5. '"There was no [warning] that if the power was not disconnected as in-
structed, manual unclogging presented the danger that a surge in the speed of
the rollers could yank a stalk so fast that a human could not release it in time
to avoid injury." Id. at 460.
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court reasoned that the manufacturer should have known that,
to save time,6 some users would not shut off the power while
unclogging the machine. Because this improper use was fore-
seeable, the court concluded that the manufacturer should
have taken every precaution to discourage it, including the
posting of a specific warning explaining the manner in which
injury might occur.
The Parks rule-that warnings must state with specificity
the consequences of improper product use-is borrowed from
the warning-defect cases in which courts have used the speci-
ficity requirement to encourage changes in product design.7
The theory of these cases is that a manufacturer will alter the
design of its machine to remove the danger rather than make
its warnings more explicit and adversely affect the product's
marketability. The availability of an alternative design, how-
ever, was not emphasized in the Parks opinion. The court evi-
dently realized that the limited protection 8 offered by the
alternative design would have rendered reliance on the alterna-
tive design theory questionable. Parks is therefore anomalous
because the court employed the specificity requirement even
though the danger was obvious and there was no demonstrably
safer design to which the manufacturer could shift.
Minnesota has not clearly defined the point at which a
manufacturer's duty to warn ceases and an individual's respon-
sibility to avoid obvious dangers begins. By requiring the man-
ufacturer of a machine to post highly specific warnings
regarding obvious dangers9 even though no safer design is
available, the court has imposed a severe burden, tantamount
to strict liability, on machine manufacturers. If the Parks court
wished merely to effectuate efficient risk spreading, it should
6. Clogs occur with some frequency, and unclogging the harvester with
the power off takes approximately five to ten minutes longer than with the
power on. See id. at 458.
7. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of
Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61
CoRNuL L. REV. 495 (1976). See also McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn.
322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967), discussed in Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler,
supra, at 501-04.
8. There was evidence that the manufacturer could have installed a
mechanical interlock device that shuts off the power when the roller chute is
opened while the power is on. The manufacturer failed to incorporate this de-
vice, believing that, to save time, users would simply disconnect it. See 289
N.W.2d at 459 & n.3.
9. Other states have refused to recognize a duty to warn when the injured
plaintiff was aware of the danger. See cases cited in Noel, Product Defective Be-
cause of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 273 n.103 (1969).
See generally Comment, 63 MmN. L. REv. 995, 997 & n.11, 999 & n.18 (1979).
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have resorted to a more appropriate vehicle than the duty to
warn doctrine.
B. DUTY TO CONTROL OR SUPERVISE
Persons who because of some special relationship'O are
able to control or supervise the conduct of another must exer-
cise reasonable care to prevent the person over whom they
have control from injuring third parties." In Larson v. In-
dependent School District No. 314,12 the Minnesota Supreme
Court refused to absolve a school principal from liability for in-
juries sustained by a student who was severely injured while
performing a gymnastic exercise for an inexperienced physical
education teacher.13 According to the court, the principal's
duty to exercise care in supervising the school's physical edu-
cation curriculum justified holding him liable for the plaintiff's
injuries. To reach this result, the court concluded that a school
principal's duty to plan and develop course curricula is a minis-
terial rather than a discretionary duty.14
By characterizing the principal's curriculum supervising
duties as ministerial, the Larson court extended the "negligent
supervision" doctrine beyond its appropriate boundaries. The
10. See note 2 supra.
11. One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to
prevent him from doing such harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965). See also id. § 315.
12. 289 N.W.2d 112 (Minn. 1979).
13. The instructor, who had taught only nine classes before the accident,
had not adequately prepared the student for the exercise. The jury found the
instructor ninety percent and the principal ten percent negligent; damages in
excess of one million dollars were assessed. See id. at 115-16.
14. Under Minnesota common law, state officials may be held liable in the
performance of ministerial but not discretionary duties. See Papenhausen v.
Schoen, 268 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1978); Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175, 247
N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976); Cf. MIMN. STAT. § 466.03(6) (1978) (holding municipalities
exempt from suits in which claim is based on performance of or failure to per-
form a discretionary function). While the discretionary-ministerial dichotomy
is often enigmatic, it is true as a general proposition that the discretionary acts
exception has greater application to decisions made on the executive or plan-
ning level than to those made on the operational level. See Hansen v. City of
St. Paul, 298 Minn. 205, 211-12, 214 N.W.2d 346, 350 (1974); cf. Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953) (construing discretionary acts exception to Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976)). The imprecision of the discre-
tionary acts doctrine serves a purpose; it enables courts to shield public
officials and bodies from inappropriate liability. Thus, the decision whether to
designate a function discretionary or ministerial should be made on the basis
of sound policy considerations, not by recourse to the hollow definitions courts
have assigned to the terms.
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proper scope of the duty to supervise is illustrated by two other
Minnesota cases decided in 1979: Quinn v. Winkel's, Inc.'5 and
Rum River Lumber Co. v. State.16 In Quinn, the court held that
a barkeeper owes a duty to his patrons to prevent individuals
whom he knows to be of violent disposition17 from entering the
bar. Similarly, in Rum River, the court held that a state hospi-
tal must exercise due care to prevent patients who are known
to be violent18 from escaping. In both cases, the court con-
cluded that the injuries resulting from the negligent supervi-
sion were foreseeable19 because the defendant had control over
one "whom [it] knows or should know to be likely to cause bod-
ily harm to others if not controlled."20
There was no evidence in Larson indicating that the new
physical education teacher was "likely to cause bodily harm" to
his students unless supervised by the principal. Indeed, the in-
structor had a teaching certificate in physical education and the
principal should have been able to presume the instructor's
competence until intervening circumstances rendered such
confidence unjustified. Moreover, the principal's duties with re-
spect to the physical education curriculum were on the plan-
ning rather than the operational (ministerial) level.2 ' For these
15. 279 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1979). The plaintiffs in Quinn were patrons of the
defendant's bar who were injured when another patron became violent.
16. 282 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1979). The plaintiff in Rum River was a lumber
yard whose inventory was damaged by a fire that had been set by an escaped
inmate of the Anoka State Hospital. The inmate escaped from a security ward
with a pass key he had taken from an unlocked office.
17. The individual who shot and injured the plaintiffs in Quinn was a fre-
quent customer of the defendant's bar, and there was evidence that the individ-
ual's violent nature was known to the bar employees. 279 N.W.2d at 67.
18. In the two months preceding the patient's escape, he "kicked a female
patient, broke electrical outlets and radiators, threw chairs [and other] objects,
... threatened the staff,... stole a visitor's car, [and] escaped three times,
committing a burglary on the'last escape." 282 N.W.2d at 883.
19. In Rum River, the specific harm caused by the escaped plaintiff-set-
ting fire to a privately owned lumberyard-was not foreseeable because he had
never exhibited pyromaniacal tendencies while under the hospital's supervi-
sion. The court held, however, that the patient's violent nature, see note 18
supra, should have made the hospital aware of the general threat of harm his
escape would pose. 282 N.W.2d at 884.
20. Rum River Lumber Co. v. State, 282 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Minn. 1979) (quot-
ing Christensen v. Epley, 36 Or. App. 535, 540, 585 P.2d 416, 420 (1978), and RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)) (emphasis added).
21. The plaintiffs in Larson had introduced into evidence a "curriculum
bulletin" that prescribed a certain course of study for secondary school physi-
cal education classes. The court noted, however, that the bulletin was simply a
guideline and did not impose any affirmative duties on the defendants. 289
N.W.2d at 118. The court also observed: 'There was neither a regulation nor a
rule which made the Superintendent [who delegated his supervisory duties to
the school's principal] personally responsible for ensuring that the provisions
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reasons, the court should have shielded the principal in Larson
by deeming as discretionary his failure to supervise the minute
details of the physical education curriculum. Courts in other
jurisdictions have taken this approach.22
The dissent's argument that this decision will cause "an
abundance of caution" and unduly restrain expert teaching pro-
fessionals is well founded. The decision appears to require
school principals to participate in the planning of certain
courses of instruction 23 whenever they are taken over by inex-
perienced teachers. Apart from the strain this is likely to cause
between teachers and school administrators, Larson will ad-
versely affect the ability of principals to perform their other ad-
ministrative duties. The increasing degree of responsibility
expected of schools with respect to the safe and orderly educa-
tion of students 24 is not a sufficient justification for burdening
school principals with a duty to supervise the minute details of
instructional plans.
of [the curriculum bulletin] were followed." Id. at 119. It seems therefore that
supervising the physical education curriculum should not be considered a min-
isterial duty; the Minnesota Supreme Court has defined a ministerial duty as
"one in which nothing is left to discretion ... , a simple, definite duty arising
under and because of stated conditions and imposed by law." Cook v. Trovat-
-ten, 200 Minn. 221, 224, 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937) (emphasis added).
22. See Wesley v. Page, 514 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 1974) (principal not liable to
injured student for failing to supervise director of school play despite having
noticed that live gunpowder was to be used for "gunshot" scene); Luce v. Board
of Educ., 2 A.D.2d 502, 157 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1956) (principal not liable for injury
sustained by child participating in activity in which parents had informed prin-
cipal that child was not to take part). See generally Drowatsky, On the Firing
Line: Negligence in Physical Education, 6 J. L. & EDUC. 481 (1977); Comment,
School's Liability for Negligent Supervision of Students, 19 WASiBUm LJ. 189
(1979).
23. The court's holding that the jury could properly find the principal liable
was based on evidence that the principal "did not actively participate in devel-
oping or administering the physical education curriculum" and did not give the
new, inexperienced teacher even "minimal guidance." 289 N.W.2d at 117. Im-
plicit in the Larson court's rationale is that there is an inherent potential for
bodily harm in the physical education regimen. Under this reasoning, a school
principal would have a duty to participate actively in the development of cur-
ricula for any course of study in which there inheres a foreseeable risk of bod-
ily harm. These probably include shop courses (danger of machinery
accidents), chemistry courses (danger of chemical burns and poisoning), and
even home economics classes (danger of accidents involving knives, kitchen
appliances, and stoves). Moreover, it appears that a principal will have to over-
see closely the transition of faculty in such courses of study.
24. See, e.g., Hodel, The Modern Concept of Duty: Hoyem v. Manhattan
Beach City School District and School District Liability for Injuries to Truants,
30 HA NTGs L.J. 1893, 1913-14 (1979).
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C. ASSUMPTION OF DuTy BY A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT
As a general rule, one who assumes a duty must exercise
reasonable care when performing it.2 Traditionally, govern-
mental bodies were protected from liability for the negligent
performance of assumed duties by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity,26 but that doctrine has been abrogated in Minne-
sota.27 Governmental bodies are now protected from liability in
many situations by the "public duty" doctrine. Under this doc-
trine, a governmental body owes no duty of care to individual
members of the public if its performance of an assumed duty is
intended to benefit the public at large.28 When, on the other
hand, a governmental body assumes a duty whose performance
is intended to benefit a specific class of individuals, it may be
liable under the "special duty" doctrine for failing to perform
the duty with reasonable care.29
The case of Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi, Inc.30 illustrates the
special duty doctrine. In Walsh, liability was imposed on the
defendant, a private contractor operating a municipal airport,
for negligently failing to extinguish a fire that destroyed the
plaintiff's airplane. The court held that although the municipal-
ity had no affirmative duty to assist in the preservation of pri-
vate property, it had assumed the duty to provide fire
protection to a specific class of individuals: users of the munici-
pal airport. Thus, the private contractor who had undertaken
the municipality's fire-fighting duties was found liable. The
willingness of the court to find a specific class of beneficiaries
in Walsh may have been due to the fact that liability would be
imposed on a private rather than public entity.
That the court may be reluctant to find a special duty if lia-
bility will fall on a public body is the implicit message of two
25. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 56, at 343-48.
26. For an analysis of the current state of the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, see Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLuM. J.L.
& Soc. PROB. 303, 310-22 (1977). See also Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immu-
nity Doctrine in the United States, 1790-1955, 1966 U. IL.. LF. 795.
27. See Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 798, § 2, 1963 Minn. Laws 1402 (current ver-
sion at Minn. STAT. § 466.02 (1978)).
28. See Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 222-23,
199 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1972).
29. "It is somewhat unfortunate that the terms 'public' duty and 'special'
duty have been used, inasmuch as they give the misleading impression that the
distinction applies only to governmental tortfeasors. Perhaps 'no duty' and 'as-
sumed' duty would be more appropriate." Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279
N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979).
30. 282 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1979).
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other 1979 cases: Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park3 ' and Per-
kins v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.32 The plaintiff in
Cracraft alleged that the city fire inspector had negligently
failed to discover a violation of the municipal fire ordinance
while inspecting a loading dock at the plaintiffs high school.
Approximately forty-five days after the inspection, a drum of
duplicating fluid stored on the dock exploded, severely injuring
the plaintiff.33 The court held that even though the municipal-
ity had enacted an ordinance requiring itself to make fire code
inspections, it did not owe a duty to any specific individual to
conduct these inspections with due care.34 The court, however,
could have found that the municipality assumed the duty to in-
spect for fire code violations to benefit a specific class-the
users of buildings located in the municipality.35
Perkins was an action for wrongful death brought by the
survivors of a man killed by a train at a railroad crossing. More
than a year before the accident, the town in which the crossing
was located sent a formal petition to the Minnesota Public
Safety Commission (PSC) requesting a determination of the
need for gates and train speed limits at the crossing. After re-
ceiving such a petition, the PSC is required by statute3 6 to hold
a public hearing in the community and decide the issues raised
within six months. No public hearing was ever held. On the
plaintiff's claim that the PSC was negligent in failing to hold a
public hearing, the court held that the time limits contained in
the statute are not mandatory and that the PSC owed no duty
to the decedent beyond what it owed to the general public. 37
The court could have held that upon receiving the petition, the
PSC owed a special duty to the users of the railroad crossing to
hold hearings on and determine the gate and speed limit issues
within six months.
The public duty doctrine is invoked to protect governmen-
tal bodies from what courts fear might be a potentially "crush-
31. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
32. 289 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. 1979).
33. In his deposition, the fire inspector stated that the container was not
on the dock at the time of his inspection, see 279 N.W.2d at 803, but this issue of
fact was not germane to the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
legal issue whether the defendant even owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.
34. Id. at 806.
35. The court seemed to imply that it would have found the existence of
such a special duty had there been evidence that members of the special class
placed "reasonable reliance" on the inspection results. See id. at 806-07 & n.8
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 324A (1965)).
36. MINN. STAT. § 216A.05(5) (1978).
37. See 289 N.W.2d at 467-68.
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big burden" of tort liability. If this burden materialized,
governmental entities would be discouraged from undertaking
important functions that otherwise will not be performed.38
This fear, however, is unfounded. The argument that tort liabil-
ity will impose a crushing burden on governmental entities was
obviously rejected by the legislature when it abrogated the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine.39 Moreover, the legislature has now
placed statutory limits on recoveries against public bodies.40
Finally, it is the justifiable expectation of the public that gov-
ernment employees will act with reasonable care. The Cracraft
dissent properly labeled the public duty-special duty distinc-
tion artificial 4l to the extent that it applies to public inspec-
tions, because a negligent inspection increases the risk of harm
to individuals who rely upon its having been properly per-
formed.4 2 Cracraft and Perkins therefore represent overly
strict formulations of duty.43
D. CONTRIBUTION: COMMON LiABILIrY RULE
In cases in which there are multiple defendants, the "com-
mon liability" rule holds that no defendant can be made to con-
tribute to a damage award unless its personal liability to the
plaintiff has been established.44 In Hart v. Cessna Aircraft
Co.,45 the widow of a man killed in a airplane crash sued the
airplane's manufacturer, Cessna, after having failed to recover
in an earlier suit against the owner-pilot. Cessna filed a third-
party complaint for contribution against the owner-pilot. The
38. See Note, supra note 26, at 317-20.
39. See 279 N.W.2d at 811 (Kelly, J., dissenting). See also Antieau, Statu-
tory Expansion of Municipal Tort Liability, 4 ST. Louis U.LJ. 341 (1957);
Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924); Note, supra
note 26, at 344-49.
40. See, e.g., MmN. STAT. § 466.04 (1978).
41. 279 N.W.2d at 808-09 (Kelly, J., dissenting). See note 29 supra.
42. If there is a definable class that relies to its detriment on the govern-
ment's performing an assumed duty, then the public duty defense should not
apply. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A(2) (1965), quoted in
Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn. 1979). The Perkins
case presents an especially good example of such reliance since the PSC was
the only body that the townspeople could turn to for the desired safety installa-
tions.
43. For a more realistic formulation of duty, see Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn.
288, 232 N.W.2d 818 (1975) (church that undertook to inspect land for dangerous
conditions prior to church activity assumed duty of adequate inspection).
44. See Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 147, 241 N.W.2d 641, 644
(1976). See also Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978); Frey v. Snelgrove,
269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1977); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigien, 213 Minn.
120, 5 N.W.2d 397 (1942).
45. 276 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1979).
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trial court granted summary judgment against Cessna's claim
for contribution and the supreme court affirmed, holding that
since the owner-pilot had already been adjudged nonnegligent,
he could not be made to contribute to a subsequent judgment
against Cessna.46 The court also held that Cessna was liable
for only the portion of the plaintiff's damages attributable to
Cessna's negligence.47
The Hart decision makes it clear that, despite apparent in-
consistencies in recent decisions, the supreme court will take a
uniform approach to contribution: only defendants of proven
culpability will be forced to contribute. This clarification was
made necessary by the 1977 case of Lambertson v. Cincinnati
Corp.,48 in which the court ordered contribution even though,
as a matter of law, there was no common liability.49 In Lam-
bertson, a worker was injured due to the negligence of both his
employer and a tool manufacturer. The employer had no liabil-
ity at law because its exclusive obligation was to pay the statu-
tory compensation award. Nonetheless, the court ordered
contribution by the employer on equitable grounds, stating that
contribution "should be utilized to achieve fairness on particu-
lar facts, unfettered by outworn technical concepts like com-
mon liability."50
The decision to order contribution in Lambertson was no
doubt prompted by the fact that both defendants were actually
culpable. The Hart court refused to extend the Lambertson eq-
uitable exception to a situation in which the party from whom
contribution was sought had already been adjudicated nonneg-
ligent.
The Hart court also recognized the inequity of forcing
Cessna to pay all of the plaintiff's damages if the jury in the
second case found some of the damages attributable to the
nonparty owner-pilot.5 1 To correct this problem, the court lim-
46. See id. at 169.
47. See id. at 170.
48. 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
49. For a discussion of the Lambertson case, see Note, Contribution and
Indemnity-an Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss Allocation
Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 109, 146-49 (1979).
50. 257 N.W.2d at 688.
51. In an earlier opinion, Anderson v. Gabrielson, 267 Minn. 176, 180 n.9, 126
N.W.2d 239, 242 n.9 (1964), the court noted that inequitable results might occur
under the common liability rule if separate lawsuits were involved. The con-
cern was that the defendant in the second suit might be held liable for the full
amount of the plaintiff's damages simply because that defendant had not been
aware of and was unable to intervene in the first suit in which the other de-
fendant was exonerated.
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ited the damages for which Cessna was liable to the portion of
total damages that the jury found attributable to Cessna. This
solution may lead to longer, more complex trials since to en-
sure full recovery plaintiffs will have to join all possible defend-
ants. Of course, Hart's incentive to consolidate claims will
promote judicial economy and help courts avoid inconsistent
results. In addition, despite its failure to clarify when equitable
considerations justify departing from the common liability
rule,5 2 Hart is consistent with comparative fault5 3 theory be-
cause it ensures that no party will be sued twice or forced to
pay more than its fair share of a damage award.
E. LIQUOR VENDOR LIABILITY
Minnesota law prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to
persons who are "obviously intoxicated."54 In Seeley v.
Sobczak,55 a wrongful death action in which damages were
sought from a liquor vendor for serving a person who was later
killed in an auto accident, the supreme court was asked to de-
termine whether scientific evidence of the decedent's extraordi-
narily high blood alcohol level could establish obvious
intoxication as a matter of law. Two expert witnesses had testi-
fied that anyone with a blood alcohol level in excess of .2 of one
percent56 "would exhibit signs of intoxication to a reasonable
person."5 7 At the time of his death, the decedent had a blood
alcohol level of .269 of one percent.5 8 There were witnesses,
however, who testified that on the night in question the dece-
dent had not appeared intoxicated. The court held that under
these circumstances the scientific evidence presented did not
establish conclusively that the decedent's intoxication was ob-
vious. 5 9
52. Although the Hart decision resolves the dual suit problem, see note 51
supra, it gives little guidance concerning the specific limits of the Lambertson
exception.
53. Minnesota has enacted a comparative fault statute. See MDmi. STAT.
§§ 604.01-.02 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
54. Id. § 340.14(l) (a) (1978).
55. 281 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1979).
56. This "percentage" refers to the number of grams of alcohol per 100 mil-
liliters of blood. See Mum. STAT. § 169.01(61) (1978). In Minnesota, a blood al-
cohol level of .1 of one percent is conclusive evidence of intoxication for the
charge of driving while intoxicated. Id. § 169.121(1) (d).
57. 281 N.W.2d at 370.
58. See note 56 supra.
59. 281 N.W.2d at 371. The court also ruled that sebtion 340.14(1) (a) of the
Minnesota Statutes provides the exclusive remedy for illegal sales of intoxi-
cants in Minnesota, superseding all common law negligence claims. See Fitzer
v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395, 403 (Minn. 1977).
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The emphasis that the court in Seeley placed on the statu-
tory term "obvious"60 indicates that to establish the defend-
ant's culpability, the plaintiff would have had to prove that the
decedent's intoxication was apparent upon a cursory visual in-
spection.6 1 The unsatisfying aspect of the case is that the sci-
entific evidence offered by the plaintiff established that the
decedent had consumed the equivalent of eighteen one-ounce
drinks of eighty proof liquor. The pattern of consumption that
could reasonably be inferred from this evidence should have
rendered the decedent obviously intoxicated, at least to the
vendor who served him, regardless of outward appearance.62
The court's refusal to construe liberally the duty of care that li-
quor vendors owe their patrons runs counter to the growing na-
tional concern over alcohol abuse.63 Had the court deemed the
scientific evidence conclusive proof of "obvious" intoxication,
or had it simply found the evidence indicative of a pattern of
consumption rendering intoxication obvious to the vendor who
60. For years, the Civil Damage Act (current version at MmN. STAT.
§ 340.14 (1978)) made persons responsible for serving liquor to persons "obvi-
ously intoxicated." A 1967 amendment removed the obvious intoxication lan-
guage. See Act of Feb. 24, 1967, ch. 19, § 10, 1967 Minn. Laws 54, 72. At this
point, the court began to use the "intoxicated person" standard of section
340.73(1) of the Minnesota statutes. Under this standard, the court held that li-
quor vendors must take "affirmative steps" to ascertain whether a vendee is
"observably" intoxicated. See Mjos v. Howard Lake, 287 Minn. 427, 435, 178
N.W.2d 862, 867 (1970). In 1971, the legislature again amended the Civil Damage
Act, reinserting the obvious intoxication requirement. See Act of May 13, 1971,
ch. 264, § 1, 1971 Minn. Laws 476. The Seeley court correctly read this legislative
history as an indication that the affirmative duty to ascertain intoxication im-
posed by Mjos did not apply to actions brought under section 340.14(1) (a) of
the Minnesota Statutes. Accordingly, it employed the standard for obvious in-
toxication that had prevailed prior to the 1967 amendment of the Civil Damages
Act. See Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 422, 72 N.W.2d 609, 615
(1955), discussed in note 61 infra.
61. This is the standard employed in Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn.
414, 72 N.W.2d 609 (1955) (differentiating between "obviously intoxicated" for
the purposes of the Civil Damages Act and "under the influence" for the pur-
poses of a driving while intoxicated charge). The court in Strand observed that
a person is obviously intoxicated
to such an extent that the seller, using his usual and reasonable pow-
ers of observation, sees or should see that the buyer is intoxicated. In
other words, there must be such outward manifestation of intoxication
that a person using his reasonable powers of observation can see or
should see that such person has become intoxicated.
Id. at 422, 72 N.W.2d at 615.
62. See 281 N.W.2d at 372 (Otis, J., concurring). Justice Otis' special con-
currence indicates that there may be situations when a liquor vendor has con-
structive notice that a customer is obviously intoxicated despite the customer's
outward appearance.
63. See, e.g., Novak v. Kirby, 287 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1979), discussed at page
1210 supra.
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served the decedent, the result would have been to decrease
the monetary incentive for liquor vendors to continue serving
patrons who have already consumed unreasonable amounts of
alcohol.
X. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
A. VOLUNTARY TERMINATION
Minnesota law prohibits the disbursement of unemploy-
ment benefits to persons who have quit their jobs voluntarily.'
Previous Minnesota decisions have analyzed the termination
issue in terms of agency theory, characterizing a termination as
"voluntary" if it resulted either directly or indirectly from an
employee's delegation of his decision-making ability.2 In 1979,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
this broad view of what constitutes "voluntary" termination.
The court classified three different types of terminations as vol-
untary: terminations resulting from a seniority provision in a
collective bargaining agreement in Stawikowski v. Collins Elec-
tric Construction Co.;3 a specific termination date in an employ-
ment contract in Loftis v. Legionville School Safety Patrol
Training Center;4 and a contract that offered only provisional
employment in Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Eco-
nomic Security v. City of Duluth.5 The disturbing aspect of
these three decisions is that the court ruled the terminations
"voluntary" even though the employees had no choice in the
matter.
The disqualified employees in these cases had urged the
court to interpret the term "voluntary" more narrowly to in-
1. See MwNn. STAT. § 268.09(1) (1) (1978) (individual is disqualified from re-
ceiving unemployment compensation if he has "voluntarily and without good
cause attributable to the employer discontinued his employment").
2. This has become known as the "constructive voluntary quit rule." See
Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp., 254 Minn. 93, 98, 93 N.W.2d 815, 819 (1958);
Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co., 252 Minn. 63, 66, 89 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1958);.
Johnson v. LaGrange Shoe Corp., 244 Minn. 354, 361, 70 N.W.2d 335, 340 (1955);
Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 57-60, 47 N.W.2d
449, 452-53 (1951).
3. 289 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Minn. 1979). Stawikowski has now been legisla-
tively overruled. See Act of May 24, 1979, ch. 181, § 11, 1979 Minn. Laws 272
(amending MmN. STAT. § 268.09(1) (1978)).
4. Finance & Commerce, July 27, 1979, at 24, col. 1 (Minn. July 27, 1979),
withdrawn on rehearing and new opinion substituted, Finance & Commerce,
June 20, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (Minn. June 20, 1980). See note 10 infra.
5. Finance & Commerce, July 27, 1979, at 23, col. 2 (Minn. July 27, 1979),
withdrawn on rehearing and new opinion substituted, Finance & Commerce,
June 20, 1980, at 2, coL 1 (Minn. June 20, 1980). See note 10 infra.
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clude only terminations in which the "decision whether to go or
to stay lay at the time with the worker alone." 6 In 1976, the
court had indicated that it might adopt this narrower standard
if presented with an appropriate case.7 Nevertheless, when the
opportunity arose, the court refused to adopt the standard, and
instead asked the legislature to consider revising the statute.8
The court chose this path for two reasons. First, it stated that
judicial reformulation of the voluntariness standard would re-
sult in an unwarranted financial obligation for employers be-
cause the increase in terminations deemed involuntary would
cause unemployment compensation taxes to rise. 9 Second, the
court considered the legislature the more appropriate body for
determining the proper function of the benefits disqualification
clause.10
6. This formulation of the voluntary discharge standard was used in
Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 435, 100 A.2d 287, 289 (1953).
It has been followed by several other states. See, e.g., Douglas Aircraft Co. v.
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 180 Cal. App. 2d 636, 645, 4 CaL
Rptr. 723, 729 (1960); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Employment Security Bd. of
Review, 210 Kan. 403, 413, 502 P.2d 645, 654 (1972); State Hosp. v. North Dakota
Employment Security Bureau, 239 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1976).
7. See Hanson v. IDS Properties Management Co., 308 Minn. 422, 426, 242
N.W.2d 833, 835 (1976).
8. Stawikowski v. Collins Elec. Constr. Co., 289 N.W.2d at 395. At the time
Hanson was decided, voluntary termination resulted only in temporary dis-
qualification (five to eight weeks) from unemployment compensation benefits.
MN. STAT. § 289.09(1) (1976). In 1977, however, the unemployment compensa-
tion act was amended to totally disqualify the employees who quit work volun-
tarily. Act of Mar. 18, 1977, ch. 4, § 8, 1977 Minn. Laws 8. See Stawikowski v.
Collins Elec. Constr. Co., 289 N.W.2d at 394.
9. Stawikowski v. Collins Elec. Constr. Co., 289 N.W.2d at 393. Funds for
unemployment compensation are derived from payroll taxes levied on employ-
ers. The rate paid by an employer is determined by adding its minimum rate to
its "experience ratio." M-NN. STAT. § 268.06(8) (1978). The experience ratio is a
function of the number of persons chargeable to the employer's account who
are receiving benefits. See id. § 268.06(5), (6) (1978). The experience ratio, in
effect, penalizes employers for failing to stabilize employment. For this reason,
the concept of employer fault has become part of the unemployment compen-
sation calculation. By emphasizing the effect of termination on the employer's
tax rate, courts have shifted the function of the disqualification issue from "lim-
iting benefits to workers unemployed through no fault of their own to limiting
payments to cases where the employer is at fault." Sirmrell, Employer Fault vs.
General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE LJ. 181,
184 (1945) (quoting Letter from A.J. Altmeyer to War Mobilization Director
Byrnes (June 2, 1944), reprinted in 90 CONG. REC. 6841-42 (1944)). For a critique
of the experience rating system and the concept of employer fault, see Arnold,
Experience Rating, 55 YALE L.J. 218 (1945); Schmidt, Experience Rating and
Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 242 (1945); Simrell, supra.
10. Stawikowski v. Collins Elec. Constr. Co., 289 N.W.2d at 395. The unem-
ployment benefits disqualification provision of section 268.09(1) of the Minne-
sota Statutes has recently been amended. See Act of Apr. 7, 1980, ch. 508, § 9,
1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 427 (West). The amendment provides that "a sepa-
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The court should have discarded its interpretation of volun-
tary termination." A standard based on the employee's intent
at the time of the termination would better reflect both the re-
alities of modern job markets and the goals underlying unem-
ployment compensation.12 Under the court's interpretation of
voluntary termination, a person who, in order to obtain work,
contractually delegates his decision-making ability concerning
termination will be denied unemployment compensation if that
delegation later results in the termination of his job. This
anomalous result occurs even though at the time of his termi-
nation the employee is willing and able to continue working. If
the legislature does not revise the voluntariness standard as
the court has suggested, the court should itself reform this un-
fair rule of law.
ration from employment by reason of its temporary nature or for inability to
pass a test or for inability to meet performance standards necessary for contin-
uation of employment shall not be deemed voluntary." Id. at 427. The
amended version of section 268.09(1) does not explicitly reject the application
of agency theory to issues of voluntary separation. It therefore seems that the
legislature has left to the discretion of the court the decision whether to con-
tinue applying agency theory to fact situations not covered by the amendment.
Loftis and City of Duluth have since been reheard and overruled. See Lof-
tis v. Legionville School Safety Patrol Training Center, Finance & Commerce,
June 20, 1980, at 2, col. 1 (Minn. June 20, 1980); Commissioner of Minn. Dep't of
Economic Security v. City of Duluth, Finance & Commerce, June 20, 1980, at 1,
col 2 (Minn. June 20, 1980). In both opinions, the court, instead of discarding
the constructive voluntary quit rule, see note 2 supra, simply stated that it
would not "expand" the rule to cover discharges based on the temporary na-
ture of the employment. Thus, the constructive voluntary quit rule remains a
part of Minnesota's unemployment compensation law, but the legislature ap-
pears to have checked the tendency of the court to expand the rule's coverage.
11. See note 10 supra.
12. For a thoughtful series of articles on the purpose of unemployment
compensation and the meaning of involuntary unemployment, see Symposium,
Eligibility and Disqualification for Benefits, 55 YALE UJ. 117 (1945).
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